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Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband
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James B. Speta t
"The technology to supply almost limitless bandwidth is now at
hand. Broadband networks already occupy the top tiers of the
telephone network, operated by regional and national telephone
companies, and the top tiers of the broadcast networks, operated by
video carriers. Only the last mile remains to be conquered. tt This
Article evaluates the battle to conquer the last mile, by surveying the
leading platforms and technologies for providing broadband
telecommunications to individual customers. The Article also
describes current regulation of those platforms, focusing on the extent
to which the owners must provide open access to unaffiliated
companies wishing to use the platforms. Addressing current
arguments made by companies seeking mandatory open access rules
for broadband platforms, this Article concludes that the nature of
consumer demand for a broadband access platform, which will be
strongly responsive to the variety of content services made available
over the platform, makes open access rules unnecessary and
potentially counterproductive.
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Introduction
The often-predicted next generation of information services now
seems genuinely at hand. The market has been found: consumers want
faster Internet connections; they want more video channels; they want
movies "on demand"; and they want new services, such as interactive
gaming and virtual reality, that telecommunications and computer
companies are only now beginning to offer. Businesses, too, want faster
services. Some want to provide these new consumer services; others want
to enhance on-line shopping, marketing, and customer service; and still
others want better connections to remote offices and telecommuters.
Yet one historic technological barrier to these services remains: the
phone lines. While computer operating speeds have greatly and rapidly
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increased, the capacity of the connections to individual computers in
homes and small businesses has remained largely unchanged. Traditional
copper telephone lines, the ends of the only true communications network
that reaches every business and residence, simply do not have enough
transmission capacity--enough "bandwidth"-to deliver these services to
individual consumers. The potential unmet market is staggering-some
estimate it in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
Four years ago, Congress demanded that the technological barrier be
eliminated, but it provided no specific program for doing so. In the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act"),' Congress provided
that the Federal Communications Commission and each state public utility
commission "shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely
basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans. ' 2 But
although it made this command, Congress provided only a vague list of
means by which the FCC and the states might accomplish this goal and
mandated merely that the FCC should, after it had disposed of most of the
Act's other business, open a general inquiry into the matter.3 Congress's
tepid legislation on this point in an otherwise fairly aggressive law is easily
understood: it had no idea how the limited capacity (or "narrowband")
local telephone lines could be upgraded to, or replaced with, systems that
have greater capacity ("broadband" systems).
While the answers remain far from clear, the four years since the
passage of the 1996 Act have provided a glimpse into the future of these
new services. Old and new companies are now racing to deliver data to
homes via new high-speed, broadband access platforms. Incumbent
telephone companies and new startups are deploying digital subscriber line
(DSL) technologies to boost the speeds over copper wires. Cable television
companies are revamping their plant to make individual locations
addressable and to support high-speed, two-way connections. A bevy of
terrestrial wireless companies are deploying new platforms, and low-earth-
orbit satellites are poised to join established satellite providers. All are
promising interactive broadband connections soon.
The past year has also seen the first sustained regulatory controversy
concerning the deployment of these new technologies. Spurred principally
by AT&T's acquisition of two of the largest cable television companies,
Internet service providers (ISPs) and others have begun arguing for
mandatory open access rules to broadband platforms. Most cable television
companies, AT&T included, require their Internet subscribers to purchase
service from their affiliated ISP. Unaffiliated ISPs claim that the cable
companies are seeking to extend a monopoly over transmission into the
I Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2 Id. § 706(a) (reproduced in the note to 47 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 111 1997)).
3 See id. § 706(b).
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market for content, and they seek regulatory rules requiring the cable
companies to provide open access for all such unaffiliated ISPs.
In this paper, I examine the technologies that may provide these new
advanced telecommunications services and the early controversy over
open access to those platforms. In a recent staff report, the FCC's Cable
Services Bureau concluded that "[b]roadband access is among the most
compelling issues in the communications industry today.. .. [B]illions of
dollars in revenues and investment are at stake." 4 Part I describes the
anticipated demand for advanced telecommunications services and the
principal physical barrier to the widespread availability of these services.
Long-distance transport networks are now, or soon will be, capable of
more than sufficient transmission rates to support these new services. The
bottleneck for advanced services involves getting them into individual
homes and businesses-the "last mile" of transmission.5
Part II discusses the technologies that seem commercially viable for
providing high-speed broadband services over the last mile in the near
future. The principal battle is between DSL technologies, which promise
greater speeds over the telephone companies' wires, and upgraded cable
television systems. But there are also several forms of terrestrial wireless,
as well as satellite services, that may provide advanced services to large
numbers of consumers.
Part III surveys the regulatory scheme that currently governs each of
these technologies, with special emphasis on open access rules. On one
end of the spectrum, incumbent local telephone companies are currently
subject not only to a significant remnant of traditional public utility
regulation, but also the new interconnection, unbundling, and cooperation
duties imposed by the 1996 Act. In the middle, new local telephone
companies are subject to interconnection duties, although they need not
provide any newly deployed elements to other carriers at a wholesale cost.
At the other end, access providers that do not use any of the existing
telephone plant (such as terrestrial wireless providers, cable television
companies, and satellite systems) may not be required even to interconnect
their facilities with those of other networks.
Finally, Part IV addresses which, if any, of these regulatory
paradigms should govern the deployment of new high-speed access
platforms and, in particular, the demands for open access to those
platforms by unaffiliated content providers. The fear, of course, is that a
monopoly owner of broadband access would restrict access to content or
extend its monopoly to information markets. I conclude that these
concerns are largely misplaced---even if, as seems unlikely, only one
4 DEBORAH A. LATHEN, FCC, BROADBAND TODAY 10 (1999) (Cable Services Bureau
Report) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdfb'.
5 See HUBER, supra note tt, at 17.
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broadband platform in fact is viable. Because demand for an access
platform will depend on the availability of a wide variety of information
services tailored to the platform, network externality theory suggests that
mandatory interconnection and unbundling rules should not be necessary.
Indeed, they may be harmful, by reducing incentives for companies to
deploy platforms in the first place.
I. The Demand for Broadband and the Problem of the Last Mile
A. The Anticipated Demand
There can be little doubt that consumers desire services that require
higher speed connections to their homes, even if the market has not had a
full opportunity to demonstrate what prices consumers will pay. This is
most clearly the case with high-speed Internet connections. Many urban
Internet users have experienced these connections at work, where they
have access to such connections through their business's high-speed
telecommunications network. 6 At home, the overwhelming majority of
analog modems operate at a slow 33.6 kilobits per second (kbps) or less,7
and the fastest available modems, which operate at fifty-six kbps, have
reached the maximum possible speeds. 8 At these speeds, complicated web
pages, pictures, and video download very slowly, and realtime video
transfer is not possible. 9 In addition to consumer demand, businesses
believe that higher speed Internet connections will increase electronic
commerce and permit new opportunities for marketing and consumer
service.10  Some analysts see the market for high-speed Internet
connections and other broadband services growing to forty million
consumers in the next several years.
6 See Wesley R. Iversen, Financial Webcasting: To See or Not To See?, FIN. SERV.
ONLINE (Sept. 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library; Broadband Bottleneck, ECONOMIST, Nov. 7,
1998, at 65, 65.
7 See Iversen, supra note 6.
8 See Stuart Gavurin, Real Options for Today's Nomads and Telecommuters, BUS. COMM.
REv., Oct. 1997, at 41, 43; Circuit Concept Governs Telecom Net, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES,
June 23, 1997, at 90, 90.
9 See In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398,
20, at 2430 (1999) [hereinafter FCC Section 706 Report]; Shira Levine, At What Price Universal
Service?, TELEPHONY, June 2, 1997, at 80, 82.
10 See Howard A. Shelanski, The Speed Gap: Broadband Infrastructure and Electronic
Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 721, 731-36 (1999). See generally Tapan K. Lala & Ozan
Tonguz, Economical Secure Broadband Access: Isn't It Time?, IEEE COMM. MAG., Nov. 1998, at 97
("Commerce through the Internet has entered the mainstream and significant revenue transactions
between increasing number of businesses and clients are demanding broadband access today.").
11 See Arik Hesseldahl, ADSL vs. Cable Modems: The Coming Battle, ELECTRONIC NEWS,
43
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Providing such high-speed Internet connections is one of the principal
reasons behind AT&T's completed merger with TCI and its proposed
merger with Media One and the consolidation of the cable television
industry. It is also the focus of the local telephone companies' attempts
to upgrade their local telephone lines through DSL technology. Bell
Atlantic, for example, has announced an agreement with America Online
(AOL), under which Bell Atlantic will sell its digital subscriber lines,
which promise Internet access speeds greater than the speed of analog
modems, as an upgrade to current AOL subscribers. 13 Every other major
local telephone company has promised to deploy similar technology to
boost Internet access speeds.'
4
Analysts also predict huge consumer demand for other services
requiring high-speed connections directly to consumers. For example,
video-on-demand, which permits consumers to access a stored database of
movies or television shows for nearly instantaneous viewing, may become
a one billion dollar a year market within the first three years, as more than
seven million households access movies on demand three times each
month-all assuming some way can be found to deploy the technology.
15
Similarly, higher bandwidths can make true telecommuting-with remote
workers having real-time access to company networks-a reality. Both
consumers and businesses want this soon: workers because it increases
their freedom and reduces commuting time, businesses because it can save
costs. 
16
Computer companies similarly are clamoring for additional
bandwidth, as microprocessor speeds far outstrip the speeds with which
computers can share information over the public phone lines or the
Internet. Bill Gates has said, "Bandwidth bottlenecks are the biggest
obstacle to where we'd like to take the PC.' 17 Andrew Grove, chairman of
Jan. 4, 1999, at 44, 44 (citing estimate by Sprint of forty million potential broadband consumers,
although other analysts estimate consumer broadband access substantially lower).
12 See, e.g., Jim Davis, TCI Deal May Speed PC-TV Marriage, CNET NEWS.COM (June 24,
1998) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,23528,00.html>; John Greenwald, A T&T's Power Shake,
TIME, July 6, 1998, at 76, 78; Ronald Rosenberg, AT&T Leading Telecom Pack; Bidding War Boosts
Firm in Convergence Race, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, 1999, at CI.
13 See Ronald Rosenberg, Phone vs. Cable: A Bits Per Second Blitz Begins, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1998, at D1.
14 See id.
15 See Video on Demand Could Be Boon, NEWSDAY, Aug. 27, 1998, at A53; see also Frank
Ahrens, Video Stores: Are They Headed to the Bottom?, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1998, at DI (quoting
Andy Semovitz of Interactive Media: "The idea of delivering movies electronically is proven and
tested and ready to roll. The only thing we're waiting for is the capacity of the wires"); Internet Video
Growing, with Video on Demand Targeted, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 26, 1999, at 1.
16 See, e.g., Michele Carleton, No More DLC Nice Guy: Demands for Faster Internet
Access, the Rise in Telecommuting and More Uses for VOD Are Turning Carriers' Attention to Next
Generation DLC Gear, TELEPHONY, Mar. 30, 1998, at 32, 32. See generally, Jo Ann Davy, Executive-
Level Telecommuting, MANAGING OFF. TECH., June 1998, at 11.
17 Chip Brookshaw et al., Last-Mile Alternatives, INFOWORLD, Sept. 21, 1998, at 90, 90
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Intel, adds: "We're just a step away from the point when every computer is
connected to every other computer. As exciting as that is, though, there's
one big problem: telecommunications bandwidth."18 As a result, both
Microsoft and Intel have invested heavily in companies attempting to
deploy broadband access technologies.
19
In sum, broadband services, once deployed, are expected to grow to a
$150 billion a year market 20 (with the market reaching $8.8 billion within
the next few years ) and, although some customers will emphasize video
while others will look for Internet access, telecommuting, or shopping, the
access regime will look the same for each. 22 With such a market to meet,
companies are racing to deploy technologies to meet the demand.
B. The Hurdle: The Last Mile
The physical barrier to companies' providing these services is the so-
called last mile into the home. "In general terms, the last mile is the
portion of a wide area network that runs from a user to the nearest
aggregation point or hub. Most often that is the telephone company's local
loop running from homes and businesses to a central switching office or
exchange."'2 3 Switching offices and interoffice transmission facilities
benefit from concentrated traffic, and investment in that capital plant can
be spread over numerous users. Although telephone companies have
substantially increased the transmission capacities between their switching
offices, and Internet backbone providers use similar high-speed facilities,
"the local loop largely remains as it has for at least the last three
decades. ' 24 FCC Chairman Kennard predicts: "Demand for bandwidth
doubles every month. But it could grow faster and consumers could see
even more benefits if the 'last mile' could carry even more."
25
(quoting Bill Gates).
18 Id. (quoting Andrew Grove); see also David D. Clark, High-Speed Data Races Home,
SCI. AM., Oct. 1999, at 94, 96 ("Ultimately, the desire for broadband communications to the home
derives from the increasing speeds of computers.").
19 See Corey Grice, Intel Eyes Fatter Pipes, CNET NEWS.COM (Nov. 12, 1998)
<http://www.news.cnet.comNews/Item/0,4,28691,00.html>; Thomas E. Weber, Inside the Race To
Grab High-Speed Connections, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1998, at B1.
20 . See Annie Lindstrom, Broadband Notebook: Let the Broadband Boom Begin!,
AMERICA'S NETWORK, Sept. 1, 1998, at 68, 68.
21 See Laura Maggi, Opt for Data, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, May 31, 1999, at 18, 22.
22 See Charles Woloszynski, Gearing Up for ADSL, BELLCORE EXCHANGE, Summer 1998,
at 2, 5 ("Internet access also appears about to subsume most of the other high-speed, high-volume
applications for which ADSL was foreseen, such as pay-per-view TV and movies, remote access to
local-area networks (LANs), video games, and catalogs for home shopping.").
23 Brookshaw, supra note 17, at 92.
24 Charles Eldering, Prospects for Broadband Deployment in a Deregulated Environment,
IEEE COMM. MAG., July 1998, at 86.
25 William Kennard, Remarks to NARUC (July 27, 1998)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/kennard/spwek822.html>.
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Why is the last mile the bottleneck? The only system that provides
ubiquitous, two-way communications is the telephone network. But the
telephone companies' local loops were engineered to carry voice
conversations and do not have sufficient bandwidth to carry broadband
services. Human voices are intelligible in the 300 to 3400 hertz (Hz)
range.26 Local loops were therefore engineered to carry a total frequency
of four kilohertz (kHz) between the customer's premises and the telephone
company's switching office, and the telephone companies' switches detect
only frequencies within this narrow range.27 A telephone network
engineered to carry voice conversations has no need of other frequencies
or additional bandwidth.
The bandwidth of voice communications thus determines the
effective rate at which a traditional modem can push data over a telephone
line. Transmission along the local loop is analog-an electrical carrier
wave varies in response to the voice energy entering the telephone
handset. 28 The typical computer modem translates the data sent by the
computer into a series of tones, which are carried over the telephone wires
in the same manner as a voice conversation-the tone is represented on the
carrier wave. Early modems simply pulsed each bit (each 1 or 0) of a data
stream by making one tone for a "1" and a different tone for a "0"; later
modems have used varying sound levels to represent collections of bits.
29
The fastest current modems, which transmit data at a rate of approximately
fifty-six kbps downstream, are also at the theoretical maximum for the
compression of data into a four kHz electrical wave. In other words,fifty-six kbps is the fastest one can transmit data over a typical telephone
26 MARTIN P. CLARK, NETWORKS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 19 (1991). Hertz is a
measure of cycles per second (1 Hz = I cycle per second).
27 The copper medium used in telephone local loops (pairs of copper wires twisted together,
sometimes called "twisted pairs") is capable of carrying higher bandwidths, but electrical signals lose
strength as they travel over wires. As a result, the effective bandwidth along the length of the local
loop, accounting for signal loss and any devices such as loading coils that boost the signal, is still
generally 4 kHz. Those living closer to central offices may have somewhat greater capacity on their
local loops, but the telephone system does not utilize this extra bandwidth. See generally CLARK, supra
note 26, at 27-33; John M. Cioffi et al., Very-High-Speed Digital Subscriber Lines, IEEE COMM.
MAG., May 1999, at 72. More importantly, filters installed in the telephone company's switching
offices eliminate from the local loop transmission frequencies other than those necessary for regular
voice conversation. INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING CONSORTIUM, ASYMMETRIC DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER
LINE TUTORIAL (visited Jan. 16, 1999) <http://www.webproforum.com/agcommsys/topic02.html>.
28 See CLARK, supra note 26, at 19-21. This is something of an oversimplification, for
telephone companies employ digital loop carriers (DLCs) in some cases. In this configuration, a local
carrier runs fiber or other trunk lines into the field. The copper loops drop off the DLC to individual
subscriber homes, and the DLC converts the analog signals on the copper subloop to digital and then
multiplexes the individual calls over the trunk line back to the switch. The DLC does no switching
itself, however. See generally BELLCORE, BOC NOTES ON THE LEC NETWORKS §§ 12.6 -12.7 (1994).
29 See, e.g., JERRY D. GIBSON, PRINCIPLES OF DIGITAL AND ANALOG COMMUNICATIONS
226-27 (2d ed. 1993); CLARK, supra note 26, at 156-64.
30 See Zdzislaw Papir & Andrew Simmonds, Competing for Throughput in the Local Loop,
IEEE COMM. MAG., May 1999, at 61,63-64.
46
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line, and even that top speed is available only to those with the cleanest
local loops-approximately half of all telephone customers.
31
Despite the relatively low speeds for data transmission over the local
loop, the rest of the telephone network can carry data at much higher
speeds. In the mid-1980s, the telephone companies began upgrading their
switches and interoffice transmission facilities (their cable and interoffice
switches) to digital transmission technology, and today almost all of these
elements are digital.32 With the advent of fiber optics, interoffice
transmission speeds have increased several times. Today, with new dense
wave division multiplexing, the interoffice communications rates approach
OC- 192, or ten gigabits per second (ten billion bits per second) on a single
fiber strand. 33 Each of the major long-distance telephone companies has
installed substantial extra fiber capacity, and several new long-distance
companies, such as Qwest Communications, are installing even more
fiber.
34
Internet backbones transmit data at similar high rates of speed. The
principal difference between telephone networks and Internet networks is
that telephone communications are "circuit-switched," while Internet
networks are "packet-switched." In a circuit-switched network, the
network establishes a dedicated connection between parties to a
communications session that is allocated to those users during the entire
length of the call.35 In a packet-switched network, data streams between
users are divided into packets and routed over the network in real time:
that is, the packet is sent by the route most efficient at the time the packet
is generated. More importantly, in a packet-switched network, when no
data is being generated (for example, when the user is reading a
31 See Alan Liss, Always On/Dynamic ISDN: It's Coming, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Apr.
1998, at 57, 57.
32 The conversion is accomplished as follows: As noted, a voice call requires four kHz of
bandwidth. The telephone company's switch samples the frequency level on the caller's line 8000
times each second and records the frequency digitally. The telephone companies determined that 256
different voice levels adequately mimicked voice conversation, so at each of the 8000 times each
second, one of 256 values is chosen. Binary numbers require eight digits to represent 256 levels, and,
therefore, a telephone call transmitted digitally in this manner requires throughput of 64 kbps (8000 x
8). See CLARK, supra note 26, at 55.
33 See Doug Allen, WDM Testing for Service Providers, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Dec.
1998, at 37, 37.
34 See JONATHAN M. KRAUSHAAR, FCC, FIBER DEPLOYMENT UPDATE: END OF YEAR
1997, at 9-12 (1998) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common-Carrier/Reports/FCC-
StateLink/Fiber/fiber97.pdf>.
35 There is a dedicated path, although it may seem discontinuous because the intermediate
digital links in a telecommunications network employ a form of time division multiplexing (TDM).
The data stream carried on each frequency used in the high-speed link is simply divided into time slots,
and individual calls, which require only a small percentage of the total throughput, are allocated to
individual slots. There is dedicated bandwidth between the users, however, because the allocation of
time slots is permanent throughout the length of the call, whether or not there is data (sound) to be
carried in any particular frame.
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downloaded web page before requesting the next one or when both parties
to a voice conversation are silent) the network does not allocate
transmission capacity to the session. In a circuit-switched network, silence
is allocated as much of the network's capacity as constant conversation,
and therefore circuit-switched networks generally do not use transmission
capacity as efficiently as do packet-switched networks.36 Nevertheless, this
difference lies in the types of switches and protocols deployed in telephone
versus Internet networks, and it does not alter raw interoffice transmission
speeds. Both telephone and Internet switches are capable of these speeds,
and, to some extent, the protocols are converging. 37 Thus, the cores of the
telephone and Internet networks are capable of carrying huge amounts of
data extraordinarily quickly and do not pose a barrier to the deployment of
advanced telecommunications services.
Similarly, content providers are beginning to convert to digital
formats that theoretically can be carried over any digital transmission
platform. For example, almost all music is now digitally recorded, and new
standards are making possible its rapid transmission. Although almost all
previously created content will need to be converted, most large content
providers such as movie companies have begun that task.
39
In sum, the principal barriers, save one, to the deployment of very fast
Internet services, video services such as video-on-demand, and computer
applications such as interactive gaming have been conquered or soon will
be. The remaining barrier is transmission over the last mile-getting these
new services into consumers' homes and businesses.
II. The New Broadband Access Platforms
The four years since the passage of the 1996 Act have seen the
development and, in some cases, initial deployments of several
technologies designed to overcome the last-mile bottleneck and to provide
high-speed transmission services to the home. Although these new
technologies join some that have been available for a time from the
telephone companies, the newer ones promise greater speeds and lower
prices. In this Part, I review the current contenders to provide transmission
for advanced telecommunications services and discuss both their
technological prospects and the hurdles facing their implementation.
36 A packet-switched network will not always use bandwidth more efficiently than a circuit-
switched network, however. In a packet-switched network, each packet of data has routing and
application headers added to the underlying data. Thus, the relative efficiency of the architectures lies
in balancing this "packet tax" against the amount of silence in a communications session.
37 See Allen, supra note 33, at 37.
38 See Margaret Quan, New Voice in Internet Music Strikes Discord, ELECTRONIC
ENGINEERING TIMES, Dec. 21, 1998, at 1,80.
39 See Brian Dipert, Compression Puts Images on a Diet, EDN, June 18, 1998, at 71, 74.
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Picking winners and losers is, at this point, tentative of course, but this Part
provides the background necessary for identifying the various regulatory
structures that govern the deployment of these services.
40
For readers wishing to skip the technology and marketing survey, the
bottom line is that cable companies are leading in the race to provide
broadband services. Telephone companies have developed a technology
that permits high-speed transport over existing copper wires, although it
does require new equipment at the subscriber's premises and at the
telephone company's central office and it cannot work on all subscriber
lines. Cable television providers can convert their systems to enable
telephony as well as high-speed Internet access and other information
services. Two kinds of new fixed wireless systems will provide a high-
speed platform to some areas. Even satellite companies are getting into the
game, providing some high-speed access services. Currently, the cable
companies have the lead to market, with the telephone companies
relatively close behind. The other access platforms, while feasible, are
generally several years in the future. The survey also reveals, however,
that none of the new access technologies will be able to provide
multichannel video services similar to those currently offered by cable
television and direct broadcast satellites.
41
A. Wireline Telephone Plant
As previously discussed, current local loops cannot carry data at high
speeds, and therefore cannot provide transmission for advanced
telecommunications services. The maximum speed for an analog modem
of fifty-six kbps is often itself unavailable. Telephone companies have sold
faster access, but those services to date have required special provisioning
at prices that make them impractical for the consumer market. The
emerging DSL technology promises inexpensive, high-speed service over
existing copper plant.
40 In its recent report to Congress, the FCC stated that broadband access should be defined
by technologies capable of operating at a minimum of 200 kbps. The FCC chose that threshold, it said,
"because it is enough to provide the most popular forms of broadband-to change web pages as fast as
one can flip through the pages of a book and to transmit full-motion video." FCC Section 706 Report,
supra note 9, 20, at 2406. 1 believe the threshold should be higher, nearer to one megabites per
second (Mbps), at least downstream, because that speed is necessary to view television-quality video.
See infra notes 60, 71. Nevertheless, there is little practical difference between these thresholds, for
current telephone plant is incapable of meeting even the lower 200 kbps speed and new platforms
therefore must be developed.
41 The balance of the article, therefore, sets to one side the regulation governing
multichannel video services, which for now includes broadcast (including new Advanced Television
Services), telephone company video systems, cable television, and direct broadcast satellites. On these
topics, see generally Glen 0. Robinson, The New Video Competition: Dances with Regulators, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 1016 (1997).
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1. Special Access
It has always been possible to buy a "fatter pipe" from the telephone
companies. Generally known as T-1 service, the telephone companies will
provide to any customer a facility capable of carrying the equivalent of
twenty-four voice channels, or a total of 1.544 megabits per second. T-1
service, however, has been prohibitively expensive, because installation
generally requires the telephone company to install new e~uipment
between the switching office and the customer's premises. Large
businesses have long purchased T-1 lines (single or multiple for even
higher speeds), but they represent almost the entire market due to
installation costs of around $1000 and monthly charges of $600 to
$1000. 43 For this reason, the FCC has concluded that only large and




In the early 1980s, the telephone companies developed ISDN-the
integrated services digital network-and nearly two million customers are
expected to subscribe by the end of 1998.45 ISDN can be provisioned over
the copper local loop, and the type of ISDN intended for provision over a
local loop provides speeds of 128 kbps in each direction.4 6 A customer
buys special terminal equipment and can then use the line simultaneously
for two voice calls, a voice call and a sixty-four kbps data session, or 128
kbps data transmission by combining two channels. This is a substantial
improvement over analog modem speeds, but it is not fast enough for real-
time video or for truly high-speed Internet access, 47 even when taking into
account that digital compression software can often increase those speeds
several fold.4  ISDN's current advantage is its relatively mature
42 See INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING CONSORTIUM, ASYMMETRIC DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER
LINE (ADSL) TUTORIAL (visited Nov. 26, 1999) <http://www.webproforum.com/adsl/topic03.html>
("Unfortunately, T-I/E-I is not really suitable for connection to individual residences. The
transmission protocol they used, alternate mark inversion (AMI), required transceivers 3,000 feet from
the central office and every 6,000 feet thereafter. AMI demands so much bandwidth and corrupts the
cable spectrum so much that telephone companies could use only one circuit in any 50-pair cable and
none in any adjacent cables. Under these circumstances, providing high bandwidth service to homes
would be equivalent to installing new wire.").
43 See Josh McHugh, Stretching Copper, FORBES, Feb. 23, 1998, at 120, 120.
44 See FCC Section 706 Report, supra note 9, 26, at 2408.
45 See Robyn Aber, Will Digital Copper Catch On?, COMM. NEWS, May 1998, at 22, 27.
46 ISDN comes in two types: basic rate interface (BRI), and primary rate interface (PRI).
BRI can be provisioned over a twisted pair, while PRI requires, at a minimum, a four-wire interface.
PRI offers the equivalent of 24 voice channels and is equivalent to a digital T-l line. See CLARK, supra
note 26, at 454,462-63; BELLCORE, supra note 28, at §§ 12.9.1 - 12.9.2.
47 See Brookshaw, et al., supra note 17, at 90-9 1.
48 See Annie Lindstrom, Comfortable Bedfellows, After All? ISDN Is Getting New Life
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technology, with established standards and nationwide availability. 49 And
Always On/Dynamic ISDN, which minimizes the stress on telephone
company switching equipment by not requiring full-time switched
channels, may lead to some price reductions and provide acceptable speeds
for remote commuting.50 Nevertheless, ISDN's basic rate over copper wire
simply cannot provide television-quality video or similar services.
3. xDSL
xDSL refers to digital subscriber line technologies, where the "x" is a
placeholder that refers to the particular DSL standard being employed.
Currently competing flavors of DSL include: SDSL, which is a symmetric,
high-speed service; ADSL, which is asymmetric in that downstream
transmission rates toward the user are greater than upstream rates; IDSL,
which is a new generation ISDN service, but offers no increase in speeds;
and RADSL, which stands for rate-adaptive DSL and promises to optimize
performance over loops whose condition may change based on weather or
other variations. The fundamental part of each of these DSL technologies
is that the local copper loop is disconnected from the telephone company's
voice switch and reattached to a digital subscriber line access multiplexer
(DSLAM). 5 The DSLAM is typically housed in the telephone company's
central office, and the DSLAM routes voice traffic back into the voice
network and routes data to a data network.
53
Once the copper wire is split off from the voice switch, the
consumer's DSL modem and the DSLAM send data streams on
frequencies not transmitted over the voice network. 54 Using a wider total
bandwidth, DSL transmits data over as many as 255 separate subchannels,
while leaving the bottom four kHz available for voice conversations. 55 The
most commonly touted type of DSL for deployment to residences and
small business, and the one being pushed by both incumbent and new
telephone companies, is ADSL. ADSL is a preferred solution for most
consumers because transmission requirements downstream-for watching
movies, receiving files, or receiving large web pages-far exceed the
From-Surprise! It's [sic] New 'Partner,"xDSL, AMERICA'S NETWORK, Nov. 1, 1998, at 13, 16.
49 See Aber, supra note 45, at 27.
50 See Annie Lindstrom, Mind Your 2BIQs: AO/DI Could Shine in 1999, AMERICA'S
NETWORK, Nov. 1, 1998, at 20, 20; Liss, supra note 31, at 58-59.
51 See FCC Section 706 Report, supra note 9, 20, at 2406, 61, at 2430.
52 See Walter Y. Chen, The Development and Standardization of Asymmetrical Digital
Subscriber Line, IEEE COMM. MAG., May 1999, at 68, 70.
53 See Ken Cavanaugh, Splitting Out the Issues of the ADSL G-lite Initiative,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Oct. 1998, at 45, 46-47.
54 See, e.g., ADSL FORUM, ADSL TUTORIAL (visited Nov. 26, 1999)
<http://www.adsl.com/adsl tutorial.html>; Cavanaugh, supra note 53, at 46.
55 See ADSL FORUM, supra note 54.
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transmission requirements in the upstream direction, which can be as little
as a few mouse clicks. 56 If a remote worker needs video conferencing or is
sending large files back upstream, SDSL better mirrors data transmission
needs. Unfortunately, overall data speed for SDSL cannot come close to
ADSL's downstream push.
57
The maximum speeds for true ADSL approach ten Mbps downstream
and one Mbps upstream, which is more than sufficient for video on
demand and blazing Internet access.58 The most likely versions for
residential consumers will provide only about 1.5 Mbps downstream.
59
These speeds are not enough, however, to mimic cable television, for it is
not sufficient bandwidth to drive multiple video signals at the same time.
60
Future versions of DSL may provide greater speeds, but they largely
depend on the telephone companies or others deploying fiber optic cable
much closer to individual homes and businesses.
DSL has the advantage of being based upon the existing telephone
network. As such, DSL is significantly cheaper to deploy than alternatives
requiring new construction. Currently, more residences and small
businesses are served by DSL-capable lines than are served by cable-
modem ready cable systems. 63 It nevertheless trails cable systems. by a
ratio of ten to one or more in subscribers.
64
Now that a technical standard has been adopted for ADSL, 65 the
principal impediments to its deployment are inappropriate local loops and
sheer cost. Although ADSL works over twisted pairs, those pairs must
meet some fairly aggressive characteristics. Principal among them are that
the pairs can extend no further than approximately 15,000 feet from the
central office; must not have long bridge taps (unterminated branches);
56 See, e.g., Woloszynski, supra note 22, at 4. Following section 706, the FCC limits its
definition of advanced telecommunications services to technologies capable of "broadband" (i.e., for
the FCC, 200 kbps or greater) in both directions. This is too limiting, for many consumers will not
demand upstream bandwidth, and the FCC's definition therefore likely excludes some viable,
competing services such as downstream delivery via direct broadcast satellite. See FCC Section 706
Report, supra note 9, 22 n.17, at 2407; infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
57 See Brookshaw et al., supra note 17, at 97.
58 See ADSL FORUM, supra note 54; Joanna Makris, DSL: Don't Be Duped, DATA COMM.,
Apr. 21, 1998, at 38; Woloszynski, supra note 22, at 4-5.
59 See Chen, supra note 52, at 68-69; Papir & Simmonds, supra note 30, at 64. Current
mass-market versions are priced around $50/month for half that speed (768 kbps). See David Schober,
Bringing DSL to Mainstreet, TELEPHONY, Aug. 2, 1999, at 8, 8.
60 See Clark, supra note 26, at 98.
61 See Vince Vittore, Video Re-emerges: Focus on VDSL Is Breathing New Life into Telcos'
Ambitions, TELEPHONY, July 6, 1998, at 58, 58.
62 See LATHEN, supra note 4, at 20.
63 See Patrick Flanagan, Will the RBOCs Turn DSL into Another ISDN?,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, May 1999, at 37, 37.
64 See id.; Brian L. Hinman, ADSL Comes Home, TELEPHONY, May 24,1999, at 40,40.
65 The principles for ADSL were developed in the late 1980s, but the international
standards-setting body established technical standards in late 1997. See Lee Goldberg, DSL
Technologies Ready for Takeoff?, ELECTRONIC DESIGN, June 28, 1999, at 53.
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must not have loading coils (originally installed by telephone companies to
diminish interference from wavelengths that DSL uses); and must not
branch from digital loop carriers.6 Taking into account all of these
restrictions, as few as 50% of telephone subscribers may be able to receive
fast ADSL service in the near future.
67
Even in those instances in which the loop can bear ADSL, the
telephone company must physically transfer it from the voice switch to the
DSLAM and must install a splitter on the customer's premises. This
splitter segregates the bandwidth for voice traffic from the bandwidth for
data traffic, thereby ensuring that voice is available even if the DSL
service fails and reducing interference between the two services. 68 This
requires a "truck roll" to the customer's house, which increases the cost.
Total costs for ADSL deployment are currently estimated at $500 per
house, plus approximately $50-100 per month for service. 6
9
To reduce costs, several telephone and computer companies are
backing an initiative known as "ADSL lite" or "G.Lite." This standard,
which the International Telecommunications Union approved for final
ratification in October 1998, provides ADSL without a splitter. Without
the splitter, the telephone company need not visit a customer's premises,
thereby reducing costs and enhancing ADSL as a "plug and play"
technology for consumers.7 ° The concession comes in maximum
transmission speeds, which are significantly lower and make the service
appropriate only for faster Internet surfing, not for full-motion video.
7 1
Several computer companies have begun shipping computers with
ADSL lite modems, 72 and several telephone companies have begun
deploying both full-scale ADSL and ADSL lite.73 In mid-1999, a total of
66 See Makris, supra note 58, at 40; Woloszynski, supra note 22, at 6. Where a DLC has
been deployed, there is no copper loop at the telephone company's switching office. As a result, there
is nothing to feed into the DSLAM at that point, and individual lines can not be broken off from the
incumbent company's network. Of course, each of these problems, with the exception of the maximum
length of the copper wire, can be solved: bridge taps and loading coils can be removed and the
DSLAM can be collocated at the site of the digital loop carrier. But such remedies increase costs.
67 See Eric Krapf, Slow Rolifor DSL, Bus. COMM. REv., Aug. 1998, at 47.
68 See Cavanaugh, supra note 53, at 46.
69 See id. at 40; Krapf, supra note 67, at 72 (quoting Covad Communications, a CLEC
offering ADSL: "Our service is $90 to $195, so we're not in the consumer price range.... Ifyou have
to do a truck roll, it's very hard to hit the consumer price point. We charge a $325 installation fee to
businesses, and that's been acceptable").
70 See Timothy Kwok, Residential Broadband Architecture over ADSL and G.Lite
(G.992.2): PPP over A TM, IEEE COMM. MAG., May 1999, at 84, 85; Hesseldahl, supra note 11, at 44.
71 See George T. Hawley, DSL: Broadband by Phone, SCI. AM., Oct. 1999, at 102, 103.
72 See Eric Auchard, Compaq Organizes High-Speed Net Push, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 1998)
<http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2164801,00.html>.
73 See Krapf, supra note 67, at 71; Susan O'Keefe, While RBOCs Drag Their Heels,
CLECs, ISPs Mean Business, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Dec. 1998, at 42; Juan Carlos Perez & Elinot
Mills, MCI Rolls Out DSL Service in US., INDUSTRY STANDARD (Nov. 19, 1998)
<http://www.thestandard.net/articles/article_print/0,1454,2591,00.html>.
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160,000 DSL lines had been deployed. 74 Private analysts estimate that
ADSL is likely to grow into a several-hundred million dollar per year
industry within a decade 75 and some predict that it will become the market
leader in the near future. 6
4. New Outside Plant
Telephone companies, of course, could deploy new outside plant
capable of higher transmission speeds. Some commentators predict that
only the widespread deployment of fiber optics to the home, or to nearly
each home, will support the full range of future telecommunications
services. 7 But these solutions are very expensive, and no company8 is
currently planning near-term fiber deployment to individual customers.
B. Cable Television Plant
Cable television is already a ubiquitous broadband technology. With
the capacity for fifty or more simultaneous video channels, cable television
has more than sufficient bandwidth to provide new telecommunications
services. The impediment to providing such services over cable TV lines is
that, as originally installed, almost all cable television plant is one-way:
information goes out to users, but there is no return path. Subscribers
cannot request information different from that which the system has
chosen to provide at any given time. Cable television companies are now
spending billions of dollars to upgrade their plant and, once converted,
cable systems very likely will be able to provide simultaneous video,
voice, and data transmission. As of August 1999, over one million
customers subscribed to cable modem service.
79
Cable's first advantage is its ubiquity: cable television systems pass
ninety-seven percent of all television households and nearly two-thirds
of all television households are cable subscribers, with half of all
subscribers purchasing some premium cable channels. 81 Annual cable
74 See LATHEN, supra note 4, at 27.
75 See id. at 27-28.
76 See Hawley, supra note 71, at 103.
77 See e.g., Steve Smith & Mark Grimes, The Access Piece, COMM. NEWS, June 1998, at 86
(ADSL and other digital copper solutions can forestall the need for "fiber to the home" or "fiber to the
curb" only until the year 2004).
78 See KRAUSHAAR, supra note 34, at 22. But see Paul W. Shumate, Jr., The Broadest
Broadband, Sci. AM., Oct. 1999, at 104, 105 (predicting increased use of fiber to the home).
79 See LATHEN, supra note 4, at 25.
80 See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Fifth Annual Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,284, 16, at 24,293-94 (1998).
81 See id. 16, at 24,293-94.
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revenues are expected to exceed thirty-two billion dollars for 1998.82 The
average cable system has fifty channels available, providing enough
capacity for advanced telecommunications services.
The possibility that cable might compete with telephone companies
has long been anticipated. As long ago as 1970, the FCC stated that "there
is a substantial expectation that broadband cables, in addition to CATV
services, will make economically and technically possible a wide variety
of new and different services involving the distribution of data,
information storage and retrieval, and visual, facsimile and telemetry
transmissions of all kinds.' 83 While the FCC's optimistic prediction did
not come true in the 1970s or 1980s, in the 1990s cable operators began to
upgrade their systems to provide two-way services. This upgrade requires
installing new equipment to facilitate two-way communications and to
permit each location on the cable system to be addressed independently.
84
Operators have been installing additional fiber and high-capacity coaxial
cable, routing hubs capable of two-way communications, and cable
modems capable of handling television, telephone, and Internet services.
85
As of August 1999, cable modem service was available to thirty-two
million homes. The best estimates place cable modem subscribership at
1.5 million by the end of 1999, 87 up from 350,000 at the end of 1998.88
However, the pace of system conversion is increasing. The cable industry
estimates that it spent six billion dollars on conversions in 1997 alone,
and AT&T's mergers with TCI and Media One are premised on AT&T
using its technical and monetary resources to push those systems to full
conversion by the end of 2000. Conversion of all systems is expected to
cost thirty-one billion dollars.9 1 Numerous computer manufacturers have
announced the availability of cable modems, and prices are expected to fall
to approximately $200 in the near future.92
82 See id. 29, at 24,300.
83 Applications of Telephone Cbmpanies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities
Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d
307, 324-25 (1970).
84 See generally Michael Finneran, The Cable Modem Picture Comes into Focus, BUS.
COMM. REV., Mar. 1999, at 22. A cable system is typically converted to digital transmission at about
the same time that upgrades to permit interactive services are made.
85 See James Careless, A Path to Digital Cable, COMM. NEWS, Oct. 1998, at 34, 34; Joseph
S. Kraemer, Tentative Steps Toward New Local Loop Technology, Bus. COMM. REV., Feb. 1998, at
42,43.
86 See LATHEN, supra note 4, at 25.
87 See id.
88 See FCC Section 706 Report, supra note 9, 54, at 2426-27.
89 Seeid. 137, at 2415-16.
90 See Davis, supra note 12; Ron Scherer, AT&T, TCI Link Starts a New Info-Age Era,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 26, 1998, at 3, 3.
91 See LATHEN, supra note 4, at 26.
92 See Brian Caufield, Broadcom's Single Chip Gives Cable a Boost, INTERNET WORLD,
Sept. 28, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library.
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When converted, cable systems can provide, in addition to video
services, telephony, Internet access, and other information services. The
prevailing standard-Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification
(DOCSIS)-defines a usable downstream rate of twenty-seven Mbps and
an upstream rate of 1.8 Mbps.93 The effective rates for individual
consumers are lower, however, because an upgraded cable system still is
not a fully circuit-switched environment. Rather, reflecting its original
design as a massive trunk-and-branch, one-way distribution system,
consumers at the end of hubs share bandwidth, with routing protocols
identifying which data streams are destined for which customers. As a
result, cable modem users experience data speeds of approximately three
Mbps downstream.
94
This use of shared bandwidth raises security concerns for businesses.
Cable operators assert they are using encryption technologies, but the
effectiveness of these systems has not yet been proved.95 Moreover, shared
use of the last mile also means that individual performance will vary;
unlike DSL or ISDN, where no other user has a claim on the last mile,
cable modem performance can vary depending on how many people in the• . 96
same local hub are actively transporting data. These variabilities may
make cable less attractive to business users accustomed to the performance
guarantees that accompany higher priced telephone services, such as T-1
access.
Nevertheless, cable seems uniquely positioned to provide the entire
package of video, telephony, and high-speed, two-way data services.
Although true video-on-demand may not be feasible in the near future,
97
this limitation is not unique to cable, and cable may be able to provide near
video-on-demand by multicasting-showing the top twenty movies
starting at twenty minute intervals-once system capacities increase with
the conversion to digital protocols. For these reasons, analysts generally
agree that cable operators are in the lead to provide high-speed access to
the home.98  0
93 See Finneran, supra note 84, at 23. For more information on DOCSIS, see
<http://www.cablemodem.com> (site provided by Cable Labs).
94 See Finneran, supra note 84, at 23; Morris Edwards, High-Speed Access Kicks into High
Gear, COMM. NEWS, Aug. 1998, at 98, 98.
95 See Edwards, supra note 94, at 98.
96 See LATHEN, supra note 4, at 19.
97 See, e.g., Matthew Boersma, High-Speed Access Roadblocks, ZDNN (Dec. I, 1998)
<http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2170781,00.html> (cable Interet provider @Home
is limiting customers to 10-minute downloads of broadcast-quality video due to bandwidth
constraints).
98 See Hesseldahl, supra note 11, at 44 (summarizing analysts' reports); Eric Krapf, Why
Cable Modems Are Winning, Bus. COMM. REV., Dec. 1998, at 16, 16. See generally Mark LaPedus,
It's ADSL vs. Cable Modems, ELECTRONIC BUYERS' NEWS, Nov. 9, 1998, at 16; Charles Mason,
Cable Modems v. DSL, AMERICA'S NETWORK, Sept. 1, 1998, at 37.
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C. Terrestrial Wireless
1. Cellular and PCS
Following FCC auctions of additional spectrum, personal
communications service (PCS) and specialized mobile radio (SMR)
providers have joined traditional cellular telephone companies in offering
mobile telephone services.9 9 As of June 1998, almost every part of the
country was served by three companies offering mobile telephone
service. 00 Each of these systems has a similar architecture: the
deployment of small area transmitters (cells) permits the reuse of spectrum
across the provider's service area; the smaller the cell size, the larger the
system capacity. 10 1 The system's connection to an individual mobile
phone is "handed off' from cell site to cell site as callers move about the
territory. Additionally, digital mobile telephone systems employ either
time division multiplexing (TDMA) or code division multiplexing
(CDMA) to reuse frequencies within a single cell. 10 2 Current cellular
systems support low-speed data services, generally at 14.4 kbps, although
some CDMA systems can support speeds of up to 76.8 kbps by
aggregating channels. 103 The process to set standards for converting these
mobile systems to multimedia and high-speed data applications has just
begun, and true multimedia services are not expected to be deployed in the
near future.
104
99 See FCC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SPECTRUM AUCTIONS, FCC 97-353, at 8-10 (1997)
(discussing the history of FCC spectrum auctions).
100 See FCC, THIRD ANNUAL CMRS COMPETITION REPORT 3 (1998).
101 See WILLIAM C.Y. LEE, MOBILE CELLULAR TELECOMMUNICATIONS 56-57, 67 (1995);
Alex Hills, Terrestrial Wireless Networks, SCI. AM., Apr. 1998, at 86, 89-90.
102 TDMA is explained in note 35, supra; CDMA is a form of spread spectrum transmission,
involving the use of the entire assigned spectrum by each transmitter in a cell, with a code being
assigned to each individual conversation and the power output of the transmitter being continuously
regulated to ensure that the cell is receiving transmissions at a similar power. CDMA permits greater
system capacity than TDMA because each cell may use a greater portion of the available system
spectrum. See LEE, supra note 101, at 503-33, 601-16; Douglas N. Knisely et al., cdma2000: A Third-
Generation Radio Transmission Technology, BELL LABS TECH. J., July-Sept. 1998, at 63, 64-65; Hills,
supra note 100, at 90; Arthur H.M. Ross, The CDMA Revolution (visited Jan. 17, 1999)
<http://www.edg.org/aross/CDMARevolution.html>. See generally Esmael H. Dinan & Bijan
Jabbari, Spreading Codesfor Direct Sequence CDMA and Wideband CDMA Cellular Networks, IEEE
COMM. MAG., Sept. 1988, at 48.
103 See Knisely et al., supra note 102, at 65; see also MUTHUTHAMBY STREETHARAN &
RAJiv KUMAR, CELLULAR DIGITAL PACKET DATA 9-11 (1996) (stating that cellular digital packet data
standard operates at 19.2 kbps, or approximately 12.8 kbps once packet overhead is accounted for).
104 See Jin Wang et al., Wireless Voice-over-IP and Implications for Third-Generation
Network Design, BELL LABS TECH. J., July-Sept. 1998, at 79, 95; Mahmoud Naghshineh & Marc
Willebeek-LeMair, End-to-End QoS Provisioning in Multimedia Wireless/Mobile Networks Using an
Adaptive Framework, IEEE COMM. MAG., Nov. 1997, at 72, 81.
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2. Terrestrial Fixed Wireless
In the past several years, the FCC has opened spectrum for the
provision of fixed wireless services. Initially, these services were known as
"wireless cable," because they were capable of only one-way transmission
and were generally used to provide video services. Wireless has some
advantages over wire systems: wireless providers need not acquire rights
of way or string cable, and they therefore have some cost and speed-of-
service advantages. 1°5 On the other hand, the FCC now charges for
spectrum-auctioning new slices to the highest bidders' 06-while wire
creates its own spectrum. The two new terrestrial wireless services
discussed below are expected to provide at least some broadband access.
a. MMDS
Multichannel multipoint distribution service (MMDS) is licensed in
the 2500 MHz band. Although originally devised to provide video
distribution to educational institutions, most educational institutions did
not use their full allotment of channels and leased excess capacity to
adjacent multipoint distribution service (MDS) providers. 107 On an analog
basis, MDS distributors could provide only thirty-three channels and theyS 108
therefore could not compete with cable television systems. MDS is
strictly a line-of-sight service-there must be an unobstructed path
between the provider's and subscriber's antennas. 109 While thirty-four
million homes are within MDS territories, MDS had only 1.05 million
subscribers at the end of 1997.110 In 1998, the FCC changed its rules,
permitting MDS providers to offer interactive services. By converting to
digital, MMDS providers can increase system capacity to 198 digital video111...
channels. That would be sufficient capacity for information services as
well, and both MCI/Worldcom and Sprint have begun investing heavily in112
MMDS. Until such conversions are made, however, MMDS will not
105 See lhor Nakonecznyj, Marketplace Demand for Bandwidth Here and Now Gives LMDS
Edge, AMERICA'S NETWORK, June 15, 1998, at S14, S14-15; Scott Seidel, Broadband Wireless
Services: In the Line of Sight, BELLCORE EXCHANGE, Spring 1997, at 19, 20.
106 See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
107 See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Fifth Annual Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,284, 81, at 24,336 (1998).
108 See id. 82, at 24,336; Seidel, supra note 105, at 20-21.
109 See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Fifth Annual Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,284, 81, at 24,336 (1998).
110 See id. 83, at 24,336-37.
IIl See Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 To Enable Multipoint Distribution Service and
Instructional Television Fixed Services Licensees To Engage in Fixed Two-Way Transmission, Report
and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 19,112, 7 n.10, at 19,115-16 (1998).
112 See LATHEN, supra note 4, at 29; Kelly Carroll, Alternative Access, TELEPHONY, Sept. 6,
1999, at 12, 12; Nancy Gohring, Sprint Readies MMDS Launch, TELEPHONY, Aug. 16, 1999, at 16, 16.
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compete either in providing traditional cable TV services or in providing
advanced telecommunications services. 
13
b. LMDS
In March 1998, the FCC concluded an auction of licenses for local
multipoint distribution systems (LMDS), the laraest of which provide one
gigahertz (GHz) in the twenty-eight GHz band. LMDS will be deployed
in a fixed cellular architecture, and individual subscribers can transmit and
receive data at speeds of at least 155 Mbps. 115 However, due to the recent
licensing, the lack of technical standards, and a dearth of equipment
suppliers, few LMDS providers are announcing near-term, large-scale
deployment. 1 16 Moreover, those few that are deploying LMDS say that it
will not be used to provide video services in competition with
broadcasters, cable television, and direct broadcast satellites.
Because of the very high frequency at which LMDS operates, it too is
strictly a line-of-sight technology. In the twenty-eight GHz band, even rain• • 118
can degrade the transmission. Although careful engineering can
overcome problems from rain, the need for direct line of sight (even tree
leaves are too thick to penetrate) means that the principal near-term market
for LMDS will be small and medium-sized businesses that cannot afford
fiber-optic data services. 119 This is precisely the market that the largest
LMDS provider, Winstar Communications, is targeting.120 AT&T also has
taken a 41% interest in Teligent, another large LMDS provider, based
principally on expected business applications. Even with this limited
market, however, some analysts are predicting that LMDS will become a
113 See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Fifth Annual Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,284, 84, at 24,337 (1998); Nancy
Gohring, The Miracle Cure, TELEPHONY, July 5, 1999, at 28, 30.
114 See LMDS Auction Closes; Winning Bidders in the Auction of the 986 Local Multipoint
Distribution Service (LMDS) Licenses, 13 F.C.C.R. 18,217, at 18,217 (1998); see also Charles Mason,
LMDS: Fixed Wireless Wave of the Future?, AMERICA'S NETWORK, June 15, 1998, at S3.
115 See Doug Allen, LMDS: A Wireless Bandwidth Bonanza Puts ILECs on Notice,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, May 1998, at 51, 51; Jason Meyers, On the Air, TELEPHONY, Nov. 23, 1998,
at 20, 24.
116 See Fred Dawson, Concerns Rise for Wireless Providers, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Nov.
23, 1998, at 101, 101; Marc Liggio, Wireless Internet-No Threat to Cable, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
Oct. 26, 1998, at 81, 81; Daniel Sweeney, LMDS: Finally Ready for Prime Time?, AMERICA'S
NETWORK, Aug. 1, 1998, at 22, 22.
117 See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Fifth Annual Report, 13 F.C.C.R 24,284, 87, at 24,339 (1998).
118 See Seidel, supra note 105, at 21-22.
119 See Allen, supra note 115, at 51-52; LMDS Grows Past New Millenium, TELEPHONY,
Aug. 24, 1998, at 58, 58; Tom McCabe, What Lies Ahead LMDS, AMERICA'S NETWORK, June 15,
1998, at S8, S10.
120 See, e.g., Gene Heftman, LMDS Set To Challenge for Last Mile Supremacy,
MICROWAVES & RF, Apr. 1999, at 30.
121 See Gohring, supra note 112, at 30.
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$8 billion industry, with about 15% of total broadband access revenues,
within five years.
D. Satellites
Although space might seem a little far to go for advanced
telecommunications services, service from direct broadcast satellites
(DBS) is already the leading competitor to cable television video service,
with more than 7.2 million subscribers as of June 1998 and fifteen million
expected by 2002.123 Four companies provide DBS service to the United
States from several satellites in geosynchronous orbit; each satellite's
coverage is at least one-half of the lower forty-eight states. 124 DBS
providers also offer Internet access service, which provides 400 kbps
downstream but uses ordinary phone lines for the upstream path. 1
25
The FCC has recently licensed several companies to launch low-earth
orbit (LEO) or medium earth orbit (MEO) 126  satellites for data
applications, including Internet access. One LEO system-Iridium-is
already operating, but it currently handles only telephone calls and data at
a mere 2.4 kbps. 127 LEO satellites orbit the earth faster than the earth's
rotational speed, and users are therefore handed off from satellite to
satellite. The theory is similar to cellular systems, except it is the antennas
(the cells) that are moving as the user stands still. 128 With LEOs, lower
power antennas can provide the return path, and delays, which can reach
several seconds for satellites in geosynchronous orbit, are diminished.
Data speeds are expected to reach sixty-four Mbps downstream and two12913
Mbps upstream. These systems are at least several years away. 130
Nevertheless, despite the massive investment required, several companies
appear committed to their deployment.131
122 See Heftman, supra note 120, at 30; Charles Mason, LMDS: Huge Niche Technology,
AMERICA'S NETWORK, Sept. 1, 1998, at 73, 73 (reporting projections by Pioneer Consulting).
123 See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Fifth Annual Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,284, 62, at 24,323-24 (1998).
124 See id. 61, at 24,323.
125 See id. 75, at 24,332; Amelia Kassel, Internet Access by Satellite, ONLINE, July 17,
1998, at 30, 30.
126 LEO satellites operate at orbits of approximately 1500 kilometers, while MEO satellites
orbit at about 10,000 kilometers; geosynchronous orbit is 36,000 kilometers. See John V. Evans, New
Satellitesfor Personal Communications, SCI. AM., Apr. 1998, at 70, 73.
127 See id. at 74-75; Toni Mack, The Skies Get Crowded, FORBES, Nov. 30, 1998, at 152.
128 See Evans, supra note 126, at 73-74.
129 See Susan O'Keefe, Watch Out DSL: Broadband Satellite Systems Are Coming,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Oct. 1998, at 35, 35; John Sweitzer, The Future of Broadband Satellite
Networks, SATELLITE COMM., July 1999, at 30.
130 See Evans, supra note 126, at 77.
131 See LATHEN, supra note 4, at 22; Robert P. Norcross, Satellites: The Strategic High
Ground, SCI. AM., Oct. 1999, at 106, 106-07.
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E. Conclusion
I have not endeavored to pick the winners or the losers. The current
consensus is that cable television has the largest headstart in terms of
subscribers, with DSL technology fairly close behind. It is also assumed
that at least one wireless technology, most likely LMDS, will provide data
services to a significant market. What the foregoing does reveal, however,
is that a number of technologies will soon compete to provide video,
telephone, and data, including Internet, services.
III. Current Regulation of Broadband Access
Different regulatory schemes govern these soon-to-be competing
technologies, each largely a legacy of the statutes or rules passed in the
technology's infancy. Although the FCC has been vigorously working to
implement, and in some cases to rationalize, the 1996 Act, and to enable
new technologies, it cannot fundamentally alter the statutory schemes.
This Part reviews the principal statutes and regulations governing
telephone companies, cable television systems, terrestrial wireless systems,
and satellite providers as each seeks to provide some or all of the advanced
telecommunications services Congress expects to be made available "to all
Americans." I focus on the rules governing integrated offerings of access
and information services, particularly rules requiring interconnection and
mandatory unbundling of transport.
Providers face one of three different levels of unbundling rules. First,
incumbent telephone companies deploying DSL technology are required to
provide other carriers access, at cost-based rates, to the fundamental
elements of their networks. Moreover, the largest incumbents must offer
interconnection to all information service providers on a nondiscriminatory
basis. Second, new telephone companies deploying DSL technologies
must permit interconnection with their DSL facilities and must permit the
resale of their transport, although they need not set discounted rates for
those services. Finally, carriers deploying entirely new loop platforms,
including wireless, cable, and satellite providers, may structure their
information services to avoid any interconnection or unbundling
regulations.
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A. Regulation as "Telecommunications Services"
1. The Communications Act, as Amended
Providers of wireline telecommunications services are
overwhelmingly regulated as common carriers. Congress modeled the
original Communications Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") 32 on the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887133 and through it applied traditional common
carrier and public utility regulation theories to telephone companies. The
1996 Act left that structure largely intact, while adding to it substantial
new duties applicable to incumbent local telephone companies in an
attempt to introduce new competition into telecommunications markets.
All providers of telecommunications services must interconnect with other
carriers, but the 1934 Act (as amended by the 1996 Act) and the FCC
currently define "telecommunications" in such a way that many new
entrants will not be required to provide high-speed infrastructures to others
who wish to use it. /
Consistent with its common carrier premise, the 1934 Act provided
that "all common carriers" engaged in wire communications shall "furnish
such communication service upon reasonable request therefor" and shall
"establish physical connections with other carriers."' 134 The 1996 Act
reiterates the fundamental interconnection obligation in slightly different
terms: "Each telecommunications carrier has the duty to interconnect
directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other
telecommunications carriers." 135  This interconnection obligation
recognizes the fundamental network externalities of telecommunications: a
consumer purchases telecommunications service to connect to others, and
the value to the consumer increases as the consumer is able to reach a
greater number of persons. Although for several decades after the
invention of the telephone many urban areas were served by more than one
noninterconnected telephone company, regulation since the 1934 Act has
recognized the benefit of requiring all networks to interconnect so that all
subscribers to any network can reach all other subscribers.
3 6
The 1934 Act also imposed the other essential features of common
carrier regulation: that the carrier's rates be just and reasonable, that the
132 Pub L. No. 73-416,46 Stat. 1064.
133 Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379; see also Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An
Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
ACT OF 1934, at 3 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
134 47 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1994).
135 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1) (Supp. 111996).
136 See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
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carrier not discriminate among customers, and that the carrier provide
service solely pursuant to tariffs filed with a federal agency having the
power to investigate rates, classifications, and practices of the carrier. r37 In
recent years, however, the FCC has eliminated rate regulation in
significant parts of the telecommunications industry. For example, it has
held that long-distance carriers are subject to effective competition and
their rates are presumptively legal. In the 1996 Act, Congress
authorized the FCC to "forbear from applying" any portion of the
Communications Act, so long as application of the statute was not
necessary to ensure just and reasonable rates and practices, to protect
against nondiscrimination, or to protect consumers, and was otherwise in
the public interest. 139 The FCC has used that power to forbid long-distance
carriers to file tariffs, finding that effective competition made the filing of
tariffs unnecessary.
Congress's principal goal in the 1996 Act was to open the local
telephone market to effective competition. 14 1 The House Report grandly,
albeit without reference to any economic literature, states that
"[t]echnological advances would be more rapid and services would be
more widely available and at lower prices if telecommunications markets
were competitive rather than regulated monopolies."' 14 2 Thus, the 1996 Act
intended widespread deregulation: "Indeed, the enormous benefits to
American businesses and consumers from lifting the shackles of monopoly
regulation will almost certainly earn the Communications Act of 1995 the
distinction of being the most deregulatory bill in history.'
143
Congress attempted in the 1996 Act to remove all of the legal and
some of the technological barriers to competition in local telephone
markets. Congress first provided that "[n]o State or local statute or
regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have
the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate
137 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-203 (1994). See generally Joseph D. Keamey & Thomas W.
Merrill, The G'eat Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV, 1323, 1331-34
(1998) (describing the history of public utility regulation after the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act and
other statutes modeled on that Act).
138 See, e.g., Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, 6 F.C.C.R. 5880
(1991).
139 See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(Supp. 11 1996).
140 See Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, lnterexchange Marketplace,
Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934 as Amended, 11 F.C.C.R.
20,730 (1996), stayed pending appeal.
141 For two comprehensive summaries of the 1996 Act, see Jonathan E. Canis & Enrico C.
Soriano, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: A Global Analysis, 4 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 147
(1996); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 123
(1996).
142 H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 47-48 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, I1.
143 Id. at48.
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or intrastate telecommunications service." 144 Congress gave the FCC
power to preempt any state regulation found to violate this standard, 145 a
great expansion of the FCC's jurisdiction. Under the scheme of the 1934
Act, the Commission had been prohibited from regulating the intrastate
activities of telecommunications carriers, and its ability to preempt state
regulations was limited to instances in which a carrier's interstate activities
were inseparable from its intrastate activities. 
146
To achieve this open competition, the 1996 Act also imposed new
duties on local telephone companies designed to open their markets to
competitors. Congress recognized that a new local telephone company
would be unlikely to replicate an entire local network as an initial entry
strategy, and, in some moments, seemed to acknowledge that the local
loop might remain a natural monopoly. Congress therefore created, on top
of duties required of all telecommunications carriers, two new classes of
duties: duties applicable to all local telephone companies (local exchange
carriers, or LECs in the Act's parlance), and duties applicable to
incumbent local exchange carriers (or ILECs).
Thus, all LECs, whether existing before the 1996 Act or born in the
era of competition the 1996 Act was designed to develop, were given five
new duties: (1) the duty not to prohibit or to limit unreasonably the resale
of its services; 147 (2) the duty to provide number portability (so that
consumers may switch telephone companies but retain their telephone
numbers); 14 8 (3) the duty to accord dialing parity (so that customers may
reach customers of other LECs by dialing no more digits than necessary to
reach customers of that LEC); (4) the duty to permit competing LECs
access to the LEC's rights of way; 15  and (5) the duty to establish
reciprocal compensation with other LECs for the transport and termination
of calls. 15 1 The first three of these duties had some precedent in either the
FCC's rules or the consent decree that broke up the Bell System, 152 while
144 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. III 1997).
145 See id. § 253(d).
146 See id. § 152(b) (1994); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986);
National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 746 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
147 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(1) (Supp. III 1997).
148 See id. §251(b)(2).
149 See id. § 251(b)(3).
150 See id. § 251(b)(4).
151 See id. § 251(b)(5).
152 See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 232-33 (D.D.C. 1982)
(requiring, by consent decree, equal access dialing (1+ dialing) to competing long distance carriers),
aff'd, Maryland v. U.S., 460 U.S. 1001 (1984); Provision of Access for 800 Service, 6 F.C.C.R. 5421,
5430 (1991) (requiring portability of 800 numbers); Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared
Use of Common Carrier Domestic Public Switched Network Services, 83 F.C.C.2d 167, 173-74 (1980)
(requiring carriers to permit resale of switched facilities), aff'd, Southern Pac. Communications Co. v.
FCC, 682 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of
Common Carrier Services and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 283-84 (1976) (same regarding private line
facilities), aff'd, American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1978).
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the last two were widely considered necessary to ensure that local
telephone companies faced a level-playing field.153
ILECs, defined as any local company providing exchange service as
of the 1996 Act's passage, were subject to further duties designed to
open their networks and markets to entry by competitors. Initially, ILECs
must negotiate interconnection agreements with any other
telecommunications carrier to govern the implementation of the ILEC's
other duties under the Act. 15  Substantively, ILECs must (1) permit
nondiscriminatory interconnection with another carrier's facilities "at any
technically feasible point in the [ILEC's] network;"' 156 (2) provide to any
other carrier unbundled access to many network elements in the ILEC's
network at cost-based rates; 157 (3) establish wholesale rates for the resale
of any telecommunications service provided by the ILEC; 158 (4) provide
notice of any changes to the ILEC's network; 159 and (5) permit the
collocation of other telecommunications carriers' equipment on the ILEC's
premises.
160
Nearly four years after the 1996 Act, the scope of these new duties
remains uncertain. It was not until 1999 that the Supreme Court decided
that the Act conferred on the FCC, not state utility commissions,
jurisdiction to make rules to implement the Act's interconnection and
unbundling sections. 16 1 Moreover, on the merits, the Supreme Court
remanded the unbundling rules to the FCC for further consideration,
162
and the FCC has just issued its revised rules.163 The ILECs still have
pending challenges to the FCC's interconnection pricing rules. 164 The FCC
had issued regulations requiring incumbents to set their prices at total
element long run incremental cost (TELRIC), a forward-looking cost
methodology. Under TELRIC, prices are not based on the incumbent's
historic cost of purchasing the plant used in the service, but rather on the
current least-cost technology that could be used to offer the service. The
153 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & GREGORY J. SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL
TELEPHONY 117-37 (1994).
154 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(h)(1) (Supp. 111996).
155 See id. §§251(c)(1),252.
156 Id. § 251(c)(2)(B).
157 Seeid. § 251(c)(3).
158 See id. § 251(c)(4).
159 See id. § 251(c)(5).
160 See id. § 251(c)(6).
161 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999). The Eighth Circuit had held
that the state commissions had jurisdiction, and had stayed the FCC's rules. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v.
FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
162 SeeAT&TCorp., 119 S. Ct. at 734-36.
163 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Third Report & Order & Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 99-238, available
in 1999 FCC LEXIS 5663, 1, at *1 (1999).
164 See1l9S. Ct. at728n.3.
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incumbents of course think that such pricing is too low, and the Eighth
Circuit must now decide that issue.
The fundamental limitation on a LEC's section 251 duties is that they
are all directed toward other "telecommunications carriers." A
telecommunications carrier only has the obligation to interconnect with
"other telecommunications carriers."' 165 Similarly, LEC duties under
section 25 1(b) are limited to "telecommunications services," 166 and ILECs
need only offer interconnection, unbundled network elements, and
collocation to "requesting telecommunications carriers."
' 167
Thus, the 1996 Act's interconnection and unbundling rules do not
directly benefit (or apply to) Internet service providers or other content
providers. Those providers, as the FCC has held in a number of
proceedings, are not "telecommunications carriers" and do not pro'Qide
"telecommunications services." This distinction originated in the 1960s, in
the FCC's Computer Inquiry proceedings. In those proceedings, the FCC
attempted to determine whether and to what extent providers of computer
services, such as early time-share data processing services, were subject to
the 1934 Act. These services were provided over telephone lines, but the
FCC attempted to find a manner in which they could be provided by non-
telephone companies without regulation while simultaneously limiting the
telephone companies' ability to leverage their monololy power over
telecommunications to gain an edge in data processing. The rules that
emerged from the Computer Inquiry proceedings drew a distinction
between "basic" and "enhanced" telecommunications services. Basic
services were those that involved only the transmission of sound or data
• . ,169
unchanged from beginning to end. Enhanced services were all other
services that "acted on the format, content, code, protocol, or similar
aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; provided the
subscriber with additional, different, or restructured information; or
involved subscriber interaction with stored information."' 170  Basic
transmission services were subject to the 1934 Act's common carrier
regulations' enhanced services were exempt from regulation under the
1934 Act. 17I Common carriers that chose to offer enhanced services at first
165 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1996).
166 Id. § 251(b)(1) (duty not to limit "resale of its telecommunications services"); id. §
251(b)(4) (access to rights of way for "competing providers of telecommunications services"); see also
id. § 251 (b)(5) (reciprocal compensation "for the transport and termination of telecommunications").
167 Id. §§ 251(c)(1), (2), (3), (6).
168 See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 390 (1980).
169 See id. at 419 ("A basic transmission service is one that is limited to the common carrier
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were required to do so through separate affiliates; 172 later, they were
permitted to offer enhanced services on an integrated basis so long as they
unbundled and made generally available all of the telecommunications
elements used in providing the service.
173
The 1996 Act perpetuates the distinction between basic and enhanced
services in its mutually exclusive definitions of telecommunications on the
one hand and information services on the other. Thus, the 1996 Act
defined "telecommunications" as "the transmission, between or among
points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without
change in the form or content of the information as sent and received."
174
Telecommunications carriers are "provider[s] of telecommunications." 17
5
By contrast, the 1996 Act defines "information service" in accord with the
FCC's definition of enhanced services:
The term "information service" means the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and
includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such
capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications
service. 176
The FCC has held under the 1996 Act that Internet service providers are
not telecommunications carriers, because they offer services for
"generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing, or making available information."
' 177
2. Advanced Services Based on Existing Copper Loops
The foregoing rules combine to govern the terms on which LECs may
deploy new broadband transmission elements based on the existing copper
loop, such as DSL modems. First, any new LEC or other
telecommunications carrier may request that an ILEC make available to it
an unbundled local loop (a twisted pair of copper fibers) so that the new
172 See id. at 395.
173 See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of
Enhanced Services, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, 20-23, at 6054-55 (1998).
174 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (Supp. 111 997).
175 Id. § 153(44).
176 Id. § 153(20).
177 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 13
F.C.C.R. 24,011, 36, at 24,030 (1998), remand pending, US WEST v. FCC, D.C. Cir. No. 98-1410
(Aug. 25, 1999); see also Petition for a Declaratory Ruling That AT&T's InterSpan Frame Relay
Service Is a Basic Service, 10 F.C.C.R. 13,717, 41, at 13,722-23 (1995).
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carrier may deploy such service to new customers. 178 The FCC has even
ruled that, upon request from another telecommunications carrier, the
ILEC must upgrade the local loop by removing bridge taps and loading
• 179
coils to make it capable of bearing DSL traffic. The carrier may also
place its DSLAM (the equipment that terminates DSL service 180 ) on the
incumbent's premises, close to the termination of the local loop and near
the other elements of the incumbent's voice network, although the
incumbent may charge reasonable rent and may impose reasonable access
rules.
18 1
Second, a LEC selling a DSL service must permit other carriers or
ISPs to purchase that service and resell it to individual customers.182 Thus,
AOL could offer its customers a package of DSL and its proprietary
Internet access by purchasing the DSL transport from a local carrier. But
local carriers other than incumbents are not required to establish wholesale
rates for the resale of their telecommunications services, 18 3 and AOL's
purchase of DSL from a non-incumbent LECwould be at full retail rates.
A non-incumbent offering DSL service also need not connect directly with
ISPs because ISPs are not telecommunications carriers under the 1996
Act. f84
An ILEC's deployment of DSL service is subject to greater
regulation. Although the FCC, in its most recent order, does not require
ILECs to provide cost-based access to the elements of its DSL service,
185
an ILEC still must permit interconnection with its DSLAMs and sale of the
DSL service at wholesale rates. Of course, ISPs such as AOL are not
themselves telecommunications carriers and could not demand
interconnection or wholesale rates directly.186 But AOL could establish an
178 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Third Report & Order, FCC 99-238, available in 1999 FCC LEXIS 5663, 165, at *187-88
(1999).
179 See id. 172-73, at *1-3, 190-95, at *21-26; Deployment of Wireline Services
Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,011, 53-54, at 24,037-38
(1998).
180 See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
181 The ILEC can impose these rates and rules under rights of collocation. See 47 U.S.C. §
251(c)(6) (Supp. II 1996). A new telecommunications carrier may choose to route the voice traffic
back onto the incumbent's network and take only the data stream generated, providing only Internet
access or other data services.
182 See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, Second Report & Order, FCC 99-330, available in 1999 FCC LEXIS 5719, 19, at *24
(1999).
183 Compare 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(1) (Supp. 111996), with 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4).
184 See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
185 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Third Report & Order, FCC 99-238, available in 1999 FCC LEXIS 5663, 306-13, at *152-
64(1999).
186 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 994-95, at 15,990 (1996).
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affiliated telecommunications carrier to do so and then market a bundle of
AOL service and DSL service purchased for resale from incumbents.
Similarly, certain of the FCC's pre-1996 Act rules permit information
services providers, including ISPs, to request interconnection with
facilities deployed by the largest ILECs. 187 Under these rules, an ISP may
request interconnection with network elements deployed by the largest
ILECs. Specifically, the Expanded Interconnection rules-which were a
pre-1996 attempt by the FCC to unbundle the local networks 188-require
the Bell operating companies and GTE to offer information services
providers interconnection to transport elements. 189 Likewise, under the
Computer Inquiry and Open Network Architecture190 rules, the Bell
companies and GTE must unbundle any transmission facilities used in
providing information services and tariff those services for purchase by
other information services providers.19 1 The FCC has held that all of these
rules survive the 1996 Act, notwithstanding that the Act's very specific
interconnection duties do not go as far.
192
In sum, under the rules currently applicable to telecommunications
carriers, any advanced services provided over existing local loops must be
provided generally to all carriers in one of the following two ways. First, if
an ILEC deploys pure DSL technology, it must permit any requesting
carrier to interconnect with the DSL loops or, at a minimum, must develop
a wholesale rate for the resale of that service. Second, if an ILEC deploys
DSL only in conjunction with its own Internet access or other information
service and the incumbent is a Bell company or GTE, then it must
unbundle the transmission capability from the information service and
permit other information service providers to connect to customers through
DSL loops. If a new telephone company or a separated affiliate of an ILEC
deploys DSL technology, it, too, must interconnect with other carriers and
must permit other carriers to resell its service but it need not interconnect
directly nor develop a wholesale price.
187 The FCC's 1UB remand order, see supra note 185, does not seem explicitly to address
this issue.
188 See generally PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW §§ 12.5.2
- .3 (2d ed. 1999).
189 See Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities, 7 F.C.C.R.
7369 (1992).
190 The Open Network Architecture rules were another pre-1996 Act initiative by the FCC to
ensure that information service providers had interconnection rights with the fundamental elements of
the local networks. See id.
191 See id.
192 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 609-12, at 15,808-09 (1996) (Expanded Interconnection rules continue
to apply); see also Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, 13 F.C.C.R. 21,011, 37, at 24,030-31 (1998) (same).
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3. Broadband Platforms (Other Than Cable and Satellites) Not
Based on the Existing Cooper Loop
The rules applicable to carriers offering DSL over existing copper
loops stand in sharp contrast to the minimal regulations applicable to any
company that bases its customer access on a technology not built upon an
ILEC's local loop. While such providers are subject to the
Communications Act generally, which covers all "interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio,"193 a carrier that provides only Internet
access or other information services over its wires, and therefore does not
sell mere transport, would not be regulated as a telecommunications carrier
at all. Hence, such a provider would not be required to make its services
generally available to or to connect with other carriers, and it could
integrate any content services with its transmission services.
Of course, many of the new entrants plan to offer some transmission
services. For example, LMDS providers are targeting large and mid-size
businesses as one of their initial markets, 194 and they are planning to
provide long-distance access services as well as Internet services. And, for
such services, they would be telecommunications carriers and subject to
basic interconnection obligations. However, these offerings will not permit
AOL or other information service providers to utilize the platform to
provide service to residential customers. Because of its greater capacity, a
high-speed business access service would be inappropriate for providing
service to a consumer.
Moreover, even if the LMDS provider were to offer a voice-
functionality to smaller subscribers, interconnection and resale is not an
option for information service providers because the 1996 Act would only
require the LMDS provider to offer for resale the very slow data service
necessary to support voice functionality. So long as the LMDS provider
bundles its "intermediate" transport capacity-i.e., the amount of
transmission necessary and effective for individual consumers desiring
information services-together with the information services themselves,
the LMDS provider need not interconnect or make that particular
transmission functionality available to other information services
providers. Thus, the FCC's rules, consistently applied, only require the
LMDS provider to offer other carriers enough data speed to enable a voice
functionality, and not the full, high-speed connection that the LMDS
provider sells with a bundle of voice, Internet access, and other
information services. 195
193 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1994).
194 See supra text accompanying notes 114-22.
195 It is important to note that it is not the fact that the carrier is providing "voice" that would
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B. Regulation as "Cable Services"
As discussed above, cable companies are quickly converting their
systems to enable high-speed Internet access, video-on-demand,
interactive gaming, and similar services requiring high transmission speeds
to end users. Cable providers, however, are explicitly not "common
carriers" for the purpose of providing cable services. In this regard, the
basic model for cable television resembles broadcast: with the exception of
specific must-carry and leased-access obligations, 196 cable providers have
nearly complete discretion in determining what channels they will carry.
Although the FCC has yet to rule on the issue directly, notwithstanding
challenges raised in the context of the AT&T/TCI merger, Internet access
and similar services provided over cable television facilities are cable
services as well. 197 Hence, to the extent a cable provider offers these
services, it may limit its subscribers' access to certain ISPs, to certain
video-on-demand databases, or to other affiliated services.
Cable television long occupied a regulatory gap in the 1934 Act.
Although its communication was "by wire," and therefore arguably within
the 1934 Act's common carrier regulation, it resembled broadcast, and
broadcasters were explicitly not common carriers.19 8 In the 1960s, the
FCC took the position that cable systems were "neither common carriers
nor broadcasters, and therefore are within neither of the principal
regulatory categories created by the Communications Act.'199 The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that the FCC's power to regulate cable
arose from its general authority to regulate communications, but was
limited to rules "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the
Commission's responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting."2 °°
Today, cable television is regulated under its own title of the
make the service telecommunications. Pure data transport is telecommunications as well. See, e.g.,
Independent Data Communications Manufacturers Association, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Ruling
That AT&T's InterSpan Frame Relay Service Is a Basic Service, Mem. Op. & Order, 10 F.C.C.R.
13,717, 22, at 13,720 (1995); Application of AT&T: Authority Under Section 214 of the
Communications Act of 1934, Mem. Op., Order & Authority, 94 F.C.C.2d 48, 11-12, at 54 (1983)
(citing Computer II Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 39, at 423 (1980)). However, the FCC has
ruled that e-mail and Internet access are information services. Thus, a data stream carrying a voice call
is likely to be the only service that involves the seamless transmission of information necessary to be a
telecommunications service. See, e.g., Computer III Further Remand Proceeding: Bell Operating
Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Computer III
and ONA Safeguards and Requirements, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, 1, at 6042 (1998).
196 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 532 (leased access), 534 (must carry), 535 (must carry for
noncommercial stations) (1994).
197 See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
198 See id. § 153(h).
199 United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 164 (1968) (summarizing CATV
and TV Repeater Services, 26 FCC 403, 427-28 (1959)).
200 Id. at 178.
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Communications Act (Title VI), and cable services are exempt from the
sort of common carrier, interconnection, and unbundling duties applied to
telecommunications carriers. In the 1984 Cable Act, Congress directly, if
inelegantly, provided that "[a]ny cable system shall not be subject to
regulation as a common carrier or utility by reason of providing any cable
service." 20 1 "Cable service" was defined to include "the one-way
transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii) other
programming service," and "subscriber interaction, if any, which, is
required for the selection of such video programming or other
programming service."'202 In 1984, Congress recognized that cable
television systems could, at least theoretically, be used to offer services in
competition with the telephone companies. Its definition of cable services
attempted to maintain separate, non-common carrier regulation for one-
way video services, while permitting regulation of cable voice and data
services. The prospect of unregulated competition was thought
unacceptable because cable providers might not be subject to universal
service and rate regulation and their "cream-skimming" of customers
might reduce the telephone companies' ability to provide universal
service.
20 3
Nevertheless, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress's
definition of "cable service" was not intended to exclude all interactive
services. To the contrary, the definition of cable services included "other
programming services," and this meant that the cable provider could offer
a wide variety of interactive services exempt from common carrier
regulation. "Other programming service" was defined as "information that
a cable operator makes available to all subscribers generally. ' 2°4 The
House committee's principal example was software downloading: to the
extent that a cable provider made available to any requesting customer the
option of requesting and then downloading software, such service would
still remain cable service. 20 5 That only some of the cable company's
subscribers might take advantage of the service, and that each subscriber
might use the service in a slightly different manner, was irrelevant. By
contrast, services resembling telephone companies' services-transmitted
information created for and destined to only a single, predetermined
user-were not cable services. The committee's examples of non-cable
services were "shop at home and bank at home services, electronic mail,
one-way and two-way transmission o[f] non-video data and information
201 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1994).
202 Id. § 522(6).
203 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 28-29 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4665-
66.
204 47 U.S.C. § 522(14) (1994).
205 See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 42, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655,4679.
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In the 1996 Act, however, Congress added to the definition of cable
services merely two words, but those words and the legislative history
indicate that Congress intended to move Internet access and any other
information service into the "cable services" definition and outside the
reach of common carrier regulation. Specifically, Congress amended the
definition of cable services to be: "the one-way transmission to subscribers
of (i) video programming, or (ii) other programming service," and
"subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or use of
such video programming or other programming service." 20 7 Although the
House Report said merely that the addition of the words "or use"
"reflect[ed] the evolution of video programming toward interactive
services, ' 2°8 the Conference Report definitively sweeps Internet access
into the definition:
The conferees intend the amendment to reflect the evolution of cable to
include interactive services such as game channels and information
services made available to subscribers by the cable operator, as well as
enhanced services. This amendment is not intended to affect Federal or
State regulation of telecommunications service offered through cable
system facilities, or to cause dial-up access to information services over
telephone lines to be classified as a cable service.
209
Arguably, the text does not support the result the conferees intended. The
addition of the term "or use" does not alter the fact that a cable service
must be either "video programming" or "other programming service," and
the word "use" merely clarifies that a subscriber not only may choose
information made available but may use that information in whatever way
the subscriber finds appropriate.
On balance, the text of the new definition of cable services is best
read to include Internet access and similar information services. As noted,
under the 1984 Cable Act, "other programming services" include
"information that a cable operator makes available to all subscribers
generally. ' 21° Cable-operator-provided Internet access gives to all
subscribers the same information contained on the Internet; a cable-
operator gateway service (such as @Home) provides the same proprietary
content to all subscribers; and a cable company video-on-demand service
206 Id. at 44, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4681.
207 47 U.S.C. § 522(6)(B) (Supp. 11 1997) (emphasis added).
208 H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 97 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 64.
209 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 169 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 182.
210 47 U.S.C. § 522(13) (1994).
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looks exactly like the software downloading service referred to as a cable
service under the 1984 Cable Act. This general availability is the
touchstone of "other programming service," and Internet access and other
information services seem obviously to fall on this side of the line.
211
Coupled with the legislative history, Internet access and other information
services are now clearly cable services and, to the extent provided by cable
providers, are exempt from common carrier regulation.
Despite this analytical clarity, however, the issue is far from settled.
In AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, the District Court ruled that a
municipality could require a cable system to open its lines to other ISPs.
212
The case is on expedited appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the FCC has filed a
brief supporting AT&T,213 and Chairman Kennard has said that allowing
municipalities to make differing decisions on open access would
"stymie[]" investment in broadband. 214 Moreover, the FCC refused to
condition the AT&T/TCI merger on such stipulations, and a 1998 report
issued by the FCC's Office of Plans and Policy describes as "possible" that
the FCC could find that Internet access and Internet content services were
cable services. The author of that report (Associate Bureau Chief of the
Cable Services Bureau) concluded that a pure connection to the Internet
would not be a cable service, but service that provided its own content
would be a cable service.
2 15
I think that these services are "cable services," but, even if they are
not, they will be subject to only minimal regulation. Cable television
services will not use elements of an ILEC's local loop. To the extent they
provide only information services, as seems likely, the Communications
Act will not require interconnection or unbundling.
In sum, Internet access and other information services provided by
cable television companies are "cable services" under the Communications
211 The service that provides problems for this interpretation is electronic mail. Although an
electronic mail service might be made available to all subscribers, individual pieces of mail are not.
The cable operator would then be offering information which is not available to all subscribers.
212 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1149 (D. Or. 1999). Broward
County, Florida, has imposed a similar requirement, and other municipalities are considering them. See
A T&TStrikes Back at County, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN SENTINEL, July 27, 1999, at I D.
213 FCC, Court Brief Underscores Consumer Benefits from the National Internet Policy of
Unregulation, (Aug. 16, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily Business/1999/db990817/
nrmc906O.txt>.
214 FCC, Chairman Kennard Calls on Cable Franchising Authorities To Promote National
Broadband Policy (June 15, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/NewsReleases/
nrmc904l .html>.
215 BARBARA ESBIN, INTERNET OVER CABLE: DEFINING THE FUTURE IN TERMS OF THE PAST
83, 88, (FCC ' OPP Working Paper No. 30, 1998), available in
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/workingpapers/oppwp30.pdf>. The working paper, which contains
a much more detailed analysis of the arguments on both sides, is published in essentially the same
form. See Barbara Esbin, Internet over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 37 (1999).
216 See supra text accompanying notes 193-95.
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Act. They are therefore exempt from regulation as common carrier
services, and cable companies cannot be required to interconnect these
services to other providers, nor can they be required to permit other
information services providers to access their systems.
C. Services Provided by Satellite
Providers of video services by satellite, such as DBS operators, are
regulated neither as broadcasters nor as common carriers. Because their
signals are scrambled and available only to subscribers, satellite video
providers are not broadcasters.217 Similarly, DBS providers are not
common carriers; they do not even bear the quasi-common carriage must-
carry and leased-channel obligations of cable television systems. 218 So
long as DBS operators continue the current architecture, providing Internet
and other information services downstream by satellite, with information
upstream from the consumer by telephone line, no current legal structure
requires the satellite provider to make its transmission facilities available
to Internet service providers or other information providers. However, to
the extent that low earth orbit or other satellite technologies permit two-
way communication with subscribers, current regulation would govern that
activity just as it does the new LMDS technologies. 2 19
D. Conclusion
The prospect that one or more new broadband access platforms might
not be required to provide access to all requesting information services
providers-such as all ISPs, all video-on-demand companies, and all
electronic newspapers-has generated substantial controversy. AOL
claims that unless AT&T/TCI is required to provide it equal access, the
competitive Internet as we know it will cease to exist and AT&T/TCI will
reconstitute the Bell System's monopoly over communications. Legislators
and regulators are taking these arguments seriously; some resolution is
necessary.
217 See Subscription Video, Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 1001, 39, at 1006 (1987); see also
Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional "Broadcast" and Wireless
"Carriage," 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1048, 1066-68 (1997).
218 See 47 U.S.C. § 549 (Supp. 111 1997).
219 See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
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IV. Indirect Network Externalities Eliminate the Need for Mandatory
Unbundling
The ultimate question, of course, is which, if any, of these different
regulatory structures should govern the deployment of advanced
telecommunications services platforms. I conclude that none of them
should. First, legal rules are unnecessary to ensure that broadband
platforms will be at least moderately open to competing providers. Second,
open access rules may well reduce a broadband access platform owner's
incentives to deploy the technology.
Briefly stated, my conclusions flow from an argument that demand
for broadband access is characterized by indirect network externalities.
Traditional telecommunications networks derive their principal value from
connecting individual users and permitting those users to exchange content
unique to both the users and the particular time-bounded connection.22
That is, consumers demand a connection. By contrast, a typical consumer
who purchases broadband access derives value not from the connection
alone, but rather from the combination of broadband access and the
complementary information services made available.
As a result, a traditional telecommunications network, especially one
that is an incumbent with a large existing subscriber base, has the incentive
to frustrate interconnection with competing networks. But a broadband
network, especially a newly developing network, does not have the same
incentive to foreclose providers of complementary information services,
even if the platform provider markets its own information services. It is
against the platform owner's interest to attempt to monopolize content-
even if the platform owner is a monopolist in transmission service. Indeed,
the development of a consumer market for broadband access depends upon
the widespread creation of such services. Applying these insights, a
broadband access provider should be permitted to offer information
services without unnecessary unbundling requirements. Moreover, because
the platform is not demanded independently, platform owners need to
provide incentives for customers to subscribe-such as keeping prices for
platform services low. Thus, platform owners need to recover some of
these foregone rents in the market for information services. An aggressive
open access rule may diminish the platform owner's initial incentives to
deploy the technology.
This Part begins with a description of the arguments being made in
favor of open access rules to broadband platforms. Essentially, information
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service providers such as Internet access companies contend that owners of
broadband access platforms will use their monopoly power over transport
to impede competition in the complementary information services. Next, I
turn to an overview of the particular economics of networks. I then apply
this economics to telecommunications networks and demonstrate the
different considerations raised by broadband access networks. I conclude
that open access rules are both unnecessary and potentially
counterproductive.
A. Arguments for Open Access
Immediately following the announcement of the AT&T/TCI merger,
Internet service providers and others began an intense lobbying effort to
secure open access rules to cable television and other new broadband
access platforms. In objecting to the AT&T/TCI merger, AOL argued that
"FCC approval of the proposed merger should include an open access
condition on the provision of last-mile broadband cable data transport
services." 221 AOL claimed that open access conditions were necessary to
ensure "robust competition in video-enabled Internet services," and that,
"[i]nevitably, absent an open access condition, consumers will be harmed
by this merger.' 222 The recently formed OpenNET Coalition, which
includes AOL, other ISPs, and long-distance carriers, argues that nothing
less than "the Internet's hallmarks of competition and consumer choice"
are at risk unless open access rules are mandated for all providers of
broadband last mile transport. 223 These claims came notwithstanding
AT&T and TCI's commitment to permit its Internet access service
purchasers to access all Internet content, including AOL. AOL and other
ISPs demanded parity with the AT&T/TCI ISP (@Home), which currently
is the required ISP for every customer purchasing high-speed Internet
access from TCI. Any other rule, they claim, would force customers that
prefer AOL or some other non-@Home ISP to "pay twice. 224 The FCC
approved the merger without imposing open access conditions, but said
that it would monitor the industry.225 More recently, several municipalities
221 Comments of America Online, Inc., Joint Applications of AT&T Corp. and Tele-
Communications, Inc. for Transfer of Control to AT&T of Licenses and Authorizations Held by TCI
and Its Affiliates or Subsidiaries, CS Docket No. 98-178, at 3 (filed Oct. 29, 1998) (copy on file with
the author) [hereinafter AOL Comments].
222 Id. at 15.
223 OPENNET COALITION, Coalition Formed To Protect Consumer Choice on the Internet
(Feb. 3, 1999) <http://www.opennetcoalition.org/news/91867826.html>.
224 AOL Comments, supra note 221, at 11.
225 See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, 14 F.C.C.R.
3160, $ 96, at 3207 (1999).
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have imposed such open access rules.
226
These arguments for open access not only touch the political hot-
button of Internet competition, but also have a strong pedigree in the
history of telecommunications regulation, which has long been concerned
that dominant telephone companies will use their control over transport
facilities to act anti-competitively against computer companies or other
information service providers. In the 1970s, the FCC undertook the First
Computer Inquiry based upon its fears that carriers providing computer
services would "engage in anti-competitive and discriminatory.. ,22728
practices." As described above, 228 the FCC's later proceedings required
either separate subsidiaries, fundamental unbundling, or both as conditions
of dominant telephone companies entering the information services
market. And, as part of the consent decree dissolving the Bell System, the
Bell operating companies were forbidden to provide information229
services.
B. The Nature of Networks
Those asserting that cable television systems and other providers of
broadband access will use their ownership of wires or other platforms to
impede competition in other markets fail to provide an economic model to
support those claims. The most plausible model, in fact, suggests
otherwise. This section provides background on the economics of
networks necessary to support my claim.
Since the mid-1970s, a branch of economics has developed dealing
with the peculiar demand effects associated with network goods.2 30 This
literature, growing up alongside focused inquiry into the economics of
regulation and of antitrust law, provides a useful approach to
226 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
227 Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 15, at 390 (1980); see also id. 18, at 391 (stating that the FCC
undertook the First Computer Inquiry because "[we were] concerned with the possibility that common
carriers might favor their own data processing activities through cross-subsidization, improper pricing
of common carrier services, and related anti-competitive practices").
228 See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
229 See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.Supp. 131, 143 (D.D.C. 1982).
That restriction was eliminated in the early 1990s. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d
1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
230 Network economics has begun to penetrate the legal literature. See, e.g., David A. Balto,
Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis To Promote Network Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 523 (1999); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalansee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of
Networks, ANTITRUST, Spring 1996, at 36; William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A Contrarian View, 7
GEO. MASON L. REV. 577 (1999); Mark A. Lemly & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Microsoft,
Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust
Decision Making, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 317 (1995); Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7
GEO. MASON L. REV. 673 (1999).
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telecommunications, for telecommunications is the prototypical network
good. As described by this literature, a "network" exists when an
individual consumer's demand for a good depends upon the number of
other consumers that also demand the good. When it does, the market is
said to exhibit "network externalities." These demand effects are
appropriately modeled as externalities because they are external to an
individual's sale and purchase transaction.
23 1
In the classic case of a network externality, a consumer's demand for
the good increases based on the number of other purchasers of the good
because the good itself becomes more valuable to individual consumers as
others also purchase it. Consider telephone service. If I am the only person
purchasing telephone service, it is not worth anything to me. It may be
worth something to me to be able to call my parents and something more if
I can reach all of my relatives or friends. The value of telephone service
continues to increase, although not necessarily at a constant rate, as
additional individuals and businesses subscribe to telephone service. A
similar example is facsimile machines. A facsimile machine is worthless to
me if I am the only one that owns one; its value increases with the
increased number of people that also buy facsimile machines. As the
purchase decisions of other consumers feed back into my valuation of the
good, the decisions of these other consumers cannot be internalized in my
purchase. The economics literature refers to this particular kind of
feedback as "direct network externalities."
232
231 See Kenneth D. Boyer, Network Externalities, in NETWORKS, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND
THE NEW TASK FOR REGULATION 13 (Werner Sichel & Donald L. Alexander eds., 1996); Joseph
Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70-71
(1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75
AM. ECON. REv. 424, 426-27 (1985); Anne Perrot, Compatibility, Networks, and Competition: A
Review of Recent Advances, 27 TRANSP. Sci. 62, 64-66 (1993). In recent years, some authors have
argued that the foregoing definition of network externalities is too broad, and that a distinction ought to
be made between network effects and network externalities. These commentators would restrict
network externalities to the direct network externalities situation, where private and social welfare do
not balance due to positive gains to other consumers from additional purchases-i.e., where there are
"unexploited gains from trade regarding network participation." S.J. Leibowitz & Stephen E. Margolis,
Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135 (1994). Indirect network
externalities would be described as network "effects," reflecting the fact that the demand feedbacks do
not result in an equilibrium in which there are unexploited gains from trade. See id. at 138-39. Lemley
and McGowan, supra note 230, at 488-500, provide a wider ranging summary of these category
problems.
232 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 231, at 424; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems
Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994); Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau, A
Selective Review of the Economics of Standardization, 12 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 183, 186 (1996). On
telephony specifically, see Lemley and McGowan, supra note 223, at 546-51. Nicholas Economides
does not follow this direct/indirect taxomony. He describes telephone service as the purchase of a
series of complementary goods-the links between individual customers and the intermediate
switching and interoffice transmission, as necessary. Viewed from this perspective,
telecommunications networks still exhibit network externalities, but they seem more akin to the
hardware/software paradigm. See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Networks and
Compatibility: Implications for Antitrust, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 651, 652 (1994). Nonetheless, the
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A different, but related, form of network arises in markets in which
there are so-called hardware and software goods. Hardware goods are
those goods, usually durables, that provide the underlying technology for a
given good or service. Software goods are those that provide the particular
variety of the good or service that the consumer demands. A common
example is video cassette players. Consumers want to watch movies. To
do so, they need a video cassette player (a hardware good) and some
prerecorded video tapes (the software goods). Other examples are
computer operating systems and computer applications, turntables and
records, and compact disc players and compact discs. These markets
display network externalities if consumer demand for the hardware good is
influenced by the variety of software goods that are compatible with the
hardware. This will often be the case; consumers are more likely to buy the
video cassette player that plays more of the available movies23 3 and are
more likely to buy the operating system compatible with the widest variety234
of applications programs. But the supply and variety of software goods
depends upon total consumer demand, and hence, an individual
consumer's value for the hardware good depends upon, and increases with,
the number of consumers purchasing the same hardware good. That is, a
larger number of consumers purchasing the hardware good creates a
greater market for, and hence a more diverse supply of, the complementary
software goods. These sorts of network effects are referred to as "indirect
network effects."
235
Network externalities can create excess inertia, meaning that some
networks may persist even after technologically superior alternatives have
been developed simply because consumers value the incumbent network's
ubiquity more than the superior features or lower cost of the new
network. 236 This will not always be the case and should never be the case
where there is perfect, costless information. But where consumers do not
expect all others--or a critical mass of others-to switch to a new
network, the embedded base of the old network may enable it to persist.
Most importantly, where the minimum size of a network is large, the
possibility of its persisting is much greater. Even apart from inertia effects,
networks characterized by strong direct network effects have incentives to
characteristic network effect of telecommunications and the unexploited social benefits from increased
service still hold. See Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG.
673,682 (1996).
233 Hence, VHS overwhelms Beta.
234 Hence, Windows dominates the Macintosh operating system.
235 See, e.g., Katz & Shapiro, supra note 231, at 424.
236 See Farrell & Saloner, supra note 231, at 71-72; Katz & Shapiro, supra note 232, at 108;
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J.
POL. ECON. 822, 825 (1986).
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exclude rivals, with each party seeking to become the sole provider.
237
C. Common Carrier Duties To Confront Direct Network Externalities
Viewed from this perspective, a telecommunications network's
common carrier obligations of interconnection and nondiscrimination
make sense for two reasons. First, in the presence of direct network
externalities, there are unexploited social gains due to the network owner's
inability to capture all of the benefits of a subscriber's entrance into the
network.238 In other words, consumer welfare can be improved by a
mandatory service rule.
Second, in the absence of interconnection, a new telephone network
seeking to unseat the incumbent not only must convince a sizeable section
of the market of its superior price or quality, but it also must convince
prospective customers of its ability to attract enough other subscribers that
any given individual would be able to reach a significant number of the
people the subscriber wishes to reach. Interconnection rights remove the
need to do the latter and hence eliminate the potential inertial effects of
direct network externalities. The entrant can represent that a subscriber
switching from the incumbent will still be able to reach all of the
incumbent's subscribers, and the entrant can compete with the incumbent
based solely on price or quality of service.
239
Although Congress did not refer to the idea of network externalities
explicitly, this was the theory behind the interconnection obligations
imposed in the 1934 and 1996 Acts. 24  Local carriers and especially
incumbent local carriers are subject to heightened interconnection
obligations,24 1 but Congress emphasized in passing section 251 (a) that all
telecommunications carriers must interconnect either directly or indirectly
with all other telecommunications carriers. 242 This is to maximize the
237 See Besen & Farrell, Choosing How To Compete: Strategies and Tactics in
Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 120 (1994).
238 See Leibowitz & Margolis, supra note 231, at 135-36.
239 See Besen & Farrell, supra note 237, at 119 ("The alternative is that firms standardize,
thus explicitly or implicitly agreeing to make their products compatible. Agreeing on a standard may
eliminate competition between technologies, but it does not eliminate competition altogether. Instead,
it channels it into different and (to economists) more conventional dimensions, such as price, service,
and product features.").
240 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(a), 251(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (establishing interconnection
obligations).
241 See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
242 See H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 71 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 36-37
("Section 241 restates the obligation contained in section 201(a) of the Communications Act of 1934
on all common carriers to interconnect with the facilities and equipment of other providers of
telecommunications services and information services. The interconnection requirement in section
201(a) is a cornerstone principle of common carriage, and it is restated here in light of its importance
and relevance as the local telephone industry undergoes the transition to a competitive market.").
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social value of a telephone network, as well as to assist the entry of new
network providers.
24 3
Some commentators have proposed that common carriage rules
cannot survive in a system in which some competitors are not subject to
the full burden of common carrier regulation. Eli Noam, for example,
argues that a private carrier's ability to use differentiated pricing and to
refuse to serve high-risk customers will give it an advantage, all other
things being equal, over any carrier required to operate as a commonS244
career. Others find common carrier rules simply incompatible with the
perceived new mandate for regulators: enhancing competition has replaced
the control of monopoly as the goal of market intervention. 245 Professors
Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill describe the overall trend away from
common carrier regulation as one of the principal aspects of "The Great
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law.,24
Nevertheless, whether or not full common carrier regulation is dead,
direct externalities justify the imposition of interconnection and
nondiscrimination obligations to eliminate potential inertia effects.
Otherwise, new entrants will face significantly greater barriers to entry,
and overall competition will suffer. Similarly, Eli Noam argues
persuasively that interconnection rules, and regulation of interconnection
prices, are necessary to prevent a price squeeze by an incumbent with
market power. That is, in the absence of such regulation, an incumbent
network with market power will simply charge an interconnection price
that will make entry by new carriers uneconomic.
247
D. Common Carrier Regulation Applied to Broadband Access
The network externalities model, however, does not support open
access rules in the context of broadband access platforms. If broadband
access platforms were considered traditional telecommunications
networks, network externalities could be used to justify a right of equal
interconnection for all users and all information service providers that
provides the transport function to all comers. Such a right of
interconnection would guarantee that each user could reach the maximum
243 See Besen & Farrell, supra note 237, at 119 ("Because the prize is so tempting, sponsors
may compete fiercely to have their technologies become the standard, and this competition will
generally dissipate part-perhaps a large part-of the potential gains.").
244 Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization H: The Impending Doom of Common Carriage, 18
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 435,442-45 (1994); Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common
Carriage Survive the Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 955, 967 (1997)
[hereinafter Noam, Universal Service].
245 See, e.g., Dean Burch, Common Carrier Communications by Wire and Radio: A
Retrospective, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 85, 86 (1985).
246 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 137, at 1363-69.
247 Noam, Universal Service, supra note 244, at 973-74.
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number of information providers, and each information provider could
reach the maximum number of potential users. In circumstances in which a
broadband access provider is the only such provider in the market, it also
follows the spirit of the FCC's Computer Inquiry and Open Network
Architecture rules.
248
I believe, however, that broadband access networks are unlike
traditional telephone networks because I believe that demand for
broadband access will be characterized by indirect, rather than direct,
network externalities. Most residential purchasers of broadband access are
not, in all likelihood, simply purchasing a higher speed connection for the
purposes of sending and receiving information at higher speeds. Rather,
broadband access is merely a component of the overall package of goods
consumers are purchasing: Internet access, video on demand, news
services, interactive gaming, and other services. In this sense, broadband
access and the related information goods are hardware and software goods.
One of the leading telecommunications consulting and analysis firms, the
Yankee Group, has written that "in the broadband service market ...
content is king. Specifically, content that requires a fat pipe is king.
Therefore, the proliferation of bandwidth-intensive applications is
ultimately the key to the significant adoption of broadband service."
249
If demand for broadband access is characterized by indirect network
externalities, then vertical integration of access providers into content may
be necessary. Especially in initial periods of deployment, broadband
access providers must ensure a supply of complementary information
services. If consumers view broadband access simply as a hardware
good-necessary to the functioning of information services and not a good
to be purchased on its own-then a broadband provider must either
provide those goods itself or arrange for a source of supply. 25 To the
extent that there is risk involved in the deployment of the broadband
technology, a provider will often find it more efficient to internalize the
risk by developing the information services itself. Moreover, in early
periods especially, the hardware provider must convince purchasers that
there will be some complementary goods, and an efficient way to make
that commitment is to guarantee supply oneself.
251
More importantly, while the producer of a hardware good has
incentives to vertically integrate its own operations, it also has strong
incentives to permit entry into the market for the supply of software goods,
248 See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
249 THE YANKEE GROUP, INTERNET MARKET STRATEGIES (Dec. 1998)
<http://www.yankeegroup.com/imsv4n I5/imsv4n I5.htm> (Executive Summary).
250 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 232, at 103.
251 See id. at 104 ("A more direct approach [to convincing consumers to join the network] is
for the network sponsor to make sunk investments that commit it to the supply of software, and to
communicate this to consumers.").
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because a consumer's demand for the hardware good increases with an
increase in the variety of software goods. More precisely, demand for the
hardware depends upon the consumer's expectations regarding the variety
of software goods that will be available in equilibrium. However, a
network owner that monopolizes the provision of complementary goods
has a commitment problem. In equilibrium, a monopolist will always
supply a smaller quantity of goods than would a competitive market, and
consumers are aware of this. Even if a monopolist charges low prices
initially, or makes large commitments to variety, consumers who must
make a long-term commitment to a technology will expect a monopolist to
seek to maximize its profits in later periods. In other words, if a consumer
must make some investment to convert to the network, it may become
concerned about being exploited in later periods after it is "locked-in."
This dynamic applies to broadband access networks, because consumers
must invest in equipment---cable modems or wireless equipment and
compatible computer peripherals-in order to switch to the service.
Thus, a rational broadband access provider will not restrict its
customers to accessing only information services it provides. In fact, the
broadband access provider has the incentive not to restrict the market for
information services and the availability of those services to its subscribers
even if it has a monopoly in the provision of broadband access. Where
network effects are strong, as I believe they are in the provision of
residential broadband access, even a monopolist will have the incentive to
encourage a wide variety of information services in order to increase
subscribership. 2 52 The foregoing relates to one of the early and central
insights of the economic analysis of antitrust law: A monopolist generally
has no incentive to "extend" or "leverage" its monopoly into the market
for complementary goods, because to do so would simply diminish
consumer demand for the monopoly good, and therefore diminish total
profits. 253 For these reasons, a profit-maximizing broadband access
252 See Besen & Farrell, supra note 237, at 122-23; Katz & Shapiro, supra note 232, at 103.
As Katz and Shapiro explain, this is related to the idea that a monopolist will license its technology to a
competitor where consumer up-front investment in converting to the monopolist's technology is high.
The licensing may be one means of convincing consumers that they will not be exploited in later
periods. Katz and Shapiro, supra; see also Joseph Farrell & Nancy Gallini, Second-Sourcing as a
Commitment: Monopoly Incentives To Attract Competition, 103 Q.J. ECON. 673, 675 & n.4 (1988);
Matutes & Regibeau, supra note 232, at 190. In this regard, two telecommunications consultants have
noted that consumers opting for a broadband access platform will likely be locked in to a degree to that
platform. For example, a cable modem cannot be disconnected from the cable system and hooked up to
an ADSL line; there are costs to switch. See Michael Weingarten & Bart Stuck, The Upcoming
Revolution in Consumer Demand, BUS. COMM. REV., May 1, 1999, at 53. Nicholas Economides has
demonstrated that a monopoly owner of a network may have similar incentives to open its network
standard to competitors. Nicholas Economides, Network Externalities, Complementaries, and
Invitations To Enter, 12 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 211, 213-14 (1996).
253 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 374-75 (1978); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 173 (1976). This result has been qualified in
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provider has no incentive to attempt to require its potential subscribers to
pay for a service that they do not want.
In the final analysis, this argument suggests retaining the distinctive
treatment for services provided as telecommunications services-i.e., raw
voice or data transport. In these circumstances, direct network externalities
dominate, and interconnection and nondiscrimination obligations are the
appropriate regulatory response. However, to the extent that providers,
responding to market demand, use their platforms principally to offer
information services, legal rules requiring unbundling are unnecessary.
Moreover, legal rules requiring open access are likely to impose
significant costs. First, an unbundling rule will reduce the platform
provider's ability to ensure that the information services are technically
appropriate for the platform. Although the platform provider can impose
its own rules through private negotiation, it has no incentive to impose
artificial rules limiting the availability of information services. Such rules
would simply diminish total consumer demand for the platform. However,
the platform provider does have an interest in ensuring that consumers
only have access to information services that will perform well on the
platform.254 A mandatory unbundling or interconnection rule would shift
this decision to regulators less equipped to make the decision.
Second, an unbundling rule creates the opportunity for rent-seeking
litigation and the inappropriate allocation of costs. Information services
providers seeking access to a broadband transport platform can be
expected to use any interconnection or unbundling right to seek such
access at low costs. Such litigation creates the possibility that regulators
will impose on the platform owners the costs of interconnection, in
addition to whatever costs are incurred simply to make the platform
255technically capable of serving multiple providers. There is no reason to
think that a regulator can determine the efficient sharing of those costs
between the platform provider and information providers better than would
private negotiations.
I readily acknowledge the limits of this analysis. For one, I have built
an anecdotal, and not an econometric, case that the demand for broadband
access services is characterized by strong indirect network externalities. I
important ways, principally through the demonstration that a monopolist will often increase its profits
by engaging in tying or other leveraging behavior. See, e.g., Patrick DeGraba, Why Lever into a Zero-
Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 3 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 433 (1996);
Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 837 (1990). However,
even where leveraging benefits the monopolist, it rarely harms consumers. More importantly, none of
these qualifications challenges the conclusion that strong network effects create incentives for open
access.
254 See THE YANKEE GROUP, supra note 249, § 111.
255 For an account of how industries and economic groups exploit political processes to
obtain beneficial regulatory effects, see generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
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think the intuition and the evidence are sound, however, and, for services
not yet available, this is the best case that can be made. Nevertheless,
market experience with actual demand characteristics may justify
reconsidering the appropriate legal rules.
Similarly, my analysis presumes strong network effects in the
relevant range. Although the equilibrium level of variety to which a
monopolist can credibly commit will always be lower than the equilibrium
level in a perfectly competitive market, a monopolist can commit to some
non-zero level of variety. A monopolist will open the supply of
complementary goods to competitors where strong network effects exist in
the range between the monopoly equilibrium level of variety and the
competitive equilibrium level of variety. Again, consumer demand for
information services seems strongly influenced by a demand for variety.
The leading telecommunications market analysts think so, as do theTelaig 257 mrethn O25 
6
FCC's chairman 5 and its Cable Services Bureau.2 58 Furthermore, in
addition to the survey I have supplied, the transformations of Prodigy,
CompuServe, and AOL seem instructive. Each of those systems began as a
closed-content system: users dialed into CompuServe, for example, and
received only content created by or affiliated with CompuServe. But,
because consumers demanded access to all of the information available on
the Internet, those providers were forced to permit their subscribers open
access to unaffiliated content on the Internet-while still providing their
own proprietary content. As one analyst put it in 1995: "All online services
are incorporating the World Wide Web into their strategy. If they don't,
they could have a limited future because the Web is where the greatest
amount of new content is being created."
259
Finally, the argument that strong indirect network effects give a
monopolist an incentive to grant some access to its broadband access
platform does not necessarily imply that the monopolist will grant
complete open access. The equilibrium amount of open access-i.e., the
amount of access that maximizes total returns to the platform provider,
taking into account network externalities and other characteristics of
market demand-may include fewer information service providers than
256 See THE YANKEE GROUP, supra note 249, § Ill.
257 See William E. Kennard, Remarks at the Federal Communications Bar, Northern
California Chapter 4 (July 20, 1999) (transcript available at
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/spwek924.html>) ("Consumers-the people who actually
drive a market-deserve and will demand an open platform. They are used to openness in the dial-up
world, and they will not want to be denied it in the broadband environment.").
258 See LATHEN, supra note 4, at 42.
259 Jiri Weiss, Online Services Take the Web for a Spin, PC WORLD, Nov. 1995, at 54, 54
(quoting Karen Burka of SIMBA Information); see also Jack Egan, Online Goes Big Time: The
Commercial Services Are Beating the Web by Joining It, US NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 20, 1995, at
104, 104; Ross Laver, High-Tech Dinosaurs?, MACLEAN'S, Nov. I1, 1996, at 50, 50; Mick O'Leary,
AOL Versus the Web for Consumer Research, DATABASE, Apr.-May 1998, at 79, 79-80.
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had the broadband access platform been subject to perfect competition.
Notwithstanding these potential objections, I believe that open access
rules should not be applied to broadband access platforms, especially at
this stage in their development. First, technical standards are not yet
established, and platform owners should be permitted to ensure that
information services transmitted over their platform will perform well.
Because consumer demand for a platform is based on the available
information services, a consumer experiencing poor service from the
information service provider may discontinue use of the platform. For
example, if a person subscribes to a cable system in order to receive high-
speed Internet access but experiences no perceptible increase in speeds
because the Internet service provider has not upgraded its servers properly,
the consumer will be dissatisfied with the entire service. Of course, the
owner of the broadband access platform can advertise that its service is
specially customized for use with the platform, but such costs can be
avoided by initial enforcement of appropriate technical standards. And,
because the monopolist has an incentive to permit access in order to
increase demand for the platform, it will not impose unreasonable
technical standards merely as an exclusionary device.
Second, open access rules that attempt to mimic perfectly competitive
markets may decrease the broadband access provider's incentives to
deploy the platforms in the first instance. A network owner's attempts to
increase subscribership require it to sacrifice some of the potential returns
from the platform, which raises the possibility that returns will be
insufficient to ensure that the new network is deployed. This effect can be
mitigated "if the network sponsor captures some of the benefits derived
from a larger network. This can occur if the hardware supplier has a stake
in the supply of software as well as hardware, either through vertical
integration, a joint venture, or contract. ' ' 6° Given congressional and FCC
policy to encourage'the near-term deployment of broadband access
platforms, an open access rule that limits a platform provider's ability to
benefit from the increasing popularity of its platform seems
counterproductive.
26 1
Third, based on my survey of the technologies, I believe that any
monopoly held by a broadband access provider would likely be
260 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 232, at 102.
261 One rejoinder might be that a monopolist owner of a broadband access platform would
always receive its full rents (and therefore not have any diminished incentive) so long as the
monopolist were not price-regulated. However, in the presence of network effects, the monopolist
frequently must give up potential rents in the hardware good in order to induce subscribership. See
Katz & Shapiro, supra note 232, at 101-03. Two analysts have predicts that new broadband providers
will repeat the strategy of early cellular phone companies and engage in deeply discounted penetration
pricing to build early subscribership. See Weingarten & Stuck, supra note 252, at 53-54.
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temporary.2 62 Moreover, even in areas where only a single provider offers
service, prices may be kept low by the prospect of quick entry by new
competitors. Competitive local carriers and LMDS providers can move
their assets relatively easily from market to market-they need not, for
example, bury any wire in the ground to provide service 63-meaning that
their costs of entry and exit are relatively low. The prospect of entry by
such parties alone provides a significant constraint on the incumbent's
ability to price discriminate or otherwise achieve supercompetitive
profits.
264
E. Reconciling the 1996 Act
Standing alone, the foregoing analysis based on network externalities
may seem to call into question the 1996 Act's requirements that ILECs
interconnect with and fundamentally unbundle their networks for use by
other carriers. Even apart from the direct network externalities which
justify interconnection rules, however, these requirements can be justified
based on Congress's view that elements of the local network are natural
monopolies and on its desire to continue universal telephone service. To
the extent that elements of the public telephone network continue to be
natural monopolies, interconnection rules alone will not permit
competitors to replace incumbents in the provision of telecommunications
services.
The classic definition of a natural monopoly was an enterprise with
continuously increasing returns to scale. 265 That definition has been
replaced with the "more general idea of subadditivity"266 : natural
monopoly obtains where, within a geographically bounded market,267 the
"specified required rate of output can be supplied most economically by a
single firm or single system." 268 Various aspects of telephone networks
have long been considered natural monopolies, and their natural monopoly
character was the basis for both initial common carrier regulation26 9 andlater for the antitrust litigation breaking up the Bell System. 0c
262 FCC policy as well is based on this belief. See LATHEN, supra note 4, at 42 (the "[Cable
Services] Bureau is not persuaded that consumers are at risk of cable establishing a bottleneck
monopoly .. "); see also FCC Section 706 Report, supra note 9, 18, at 2405.
263 See FCC Section 706 Report, supra note 9, 49 & n. 110, at 2424-25.
264 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 290-93 (rev. ed. 1988).
265 See Thomas Hazlett, The Curious Evolution of Natural Monopoly Theory, in
UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES I, 10-11 (Robert W. Poole ed., 1985); WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE
THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 21-24 (1982).
266 Hazlett, supra note 265, at 15.
267 See id. at 16.
268 Id. at 15.
269 See Robinson, supra note 133, at 6-7.
270 See, e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1133
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In the 1996 Act, Congress acted on its belief that legal regulation had
long since replaced technological limitations as the reason most telephone
services were provided by monopoly local carriers.2 7 1 It recognized,
however, that certain elements of the local network-and local loops
especially-might remain natural monopolies, and it would therefore be
unrealistic, as well as uneconomic, to expect other carriers to reproduce
these elements. 272 Thus, in order to permit competition to the maximum
extent possible, the 1996 Act ordered incumbents to make network
elements available if they are "necessary" and if failure to do so would
"impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to
provide the services that it seeks to offer."'273 The other principal duties the
Act imposed on incumbents-to permit interconnection wherever
technically feasible and to permit collocation of other carriers'
equipment-can be explained as necessary to permit new telephone
companies to use the natural monopoly aspects of the incumbent's network
at no greater cost than the incumbent.
At the current time, there is no reason to believe that any particular
broadband platform, or any of a platform's elements, is a natural
monopoly. Moreover, the FCC has explicitly rejected the monopoly
model: "We believe it is premature to conclude that there will not be
competition in the consumer market for broadband. The preconditions for
monopoly seem absent." 275 So, while the copper loop may remain a
natural monopoly for the purposes of telephone service, it should not be
treated as such for the deployment of advanced broadband services. More
importantly, indirect network externality effects, which dominate for
broadband services, suggest that even a monopolist will provide open
access to competing content providers. Therefore, interconnection and
unbundling rules are warranted for incumbent local telephone networks
providing "telecommunications" that, for their principal purpose-
telephone calls-are subject both to direct network externalities and
(7th Cir. 1983); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 183 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff'd, Maryland v. U.S., 460 U.S. 1001 (1984).
271 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 49-51 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
13-14.
272 See, e.g., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 14,171, 6, at 14,175
(1996) (discussing theory behind the 1996 Act).
273 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2)(B) (Supp. II1 1997); see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119
S. Ct. 721, 734-36 (1999).
274 This leaves unexplained the requirement that incumbents develop wholesale prices, at an
avoided costs level, for resale of telecommunications services. This rule helps entrants avoid joint
demand problems, where consumers demand certain goods or services together. The resale rule assists
entry into a market by a competitor that can provide one of the joint goods at a lower price. It also puts
pressure on incumbents to minimize marketing and other costs associated with the service.
275 FCC Section 706 Report, supra note 9, 48, at 2423-24.
276 See id 48 n.102, at 2423 ("Incumbent LECs do, however, have market power in the
related market for narrowband telecommunication.").
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ne calls-are subject both to direct network externalities and elements of
natural monopoly, but such rules are not warranted for the deployment of
advanced services either by incumbents or new carriers.
So why are AOL and other Internet service providers pushing for
open access? The best answer, at this time, is that they are unwilling to pay
the full price that the cable providers want to charge. The open-access
advocates are seeking to gamer a regulatory imperative that they be
provided access, which they will quickly follow with complaints that the
cable systems are setting their prices too high. There may well be good
arguments for price-regulation of the cable systems, but those arguments
should be made explicitly, for they implicate the incentives that companies
have to deploy the new technologies.
Conclusion
The approach I have suggested for broadband access platforms, which
is based on their exhibiting indirect network externalities, suggests that the
cable television model should be adopted and made applicable to all
carriers deploying broadband information services. A carrier that deploys
high-speed access services alone (i.e., without associated content) should
still be subject to the interconnection duties specified in the
Communications Act,27 7 for in that case direct network externalities
dominate, and consumer welfare is enhanced by eliminating the
competition between platforms. In other words, to the extent that a carrier
is providing "telecommunications," whether it be plain old telephone
service or a new high-speed data pipe, interconnection and
nondiscrimination should be imposed by rule. This rule, of course, extends
only to interconnection with other telecommunications carriers, not to
information services providers, although they certainly will be able to
connect through affiliated or open-access telecommunications carriers.
However, to the extent that companies deploy broadband platforms
coupled with information services, interconnection duties will be
unnecessary and unwise. Thus, section 25 1(c)'s fundamental unbundling
rules, and the FCC's related Computer Inquiry and Open Network
Architecture rules, should not apply even to incumbent local carriers that
deploy new network elements, such as DSL, if those elements are
deployed only for information services.
High-speed, digital transport systems are proliferating, and several
competing companies promise to provide the "last mile" of access,
permitting consumers to take advantage of new information services in
their homes. These service providers currently are subject to differing
277 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(a), 251(a) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997).
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regulatory burdens, and the degree to which they will be required to
unbundle their transport from content services and interconnect with other
information services providers remains unsettled. From the perspective of
network externalities, and the fact that broadband access technologies are,
unlike narrowband transport, likely demand-dependent on the development
of those very information services, regulation should not be needed to
ensure the competitive provision of such service. More importantly, such
fundamental unbundling may diminish a provider's early ability to ensure
demand and returns sufficient to justify the initial deployment of the
platform.
Advanced telecommunications services "to all Americans" might not
be here nearly so soon as commentators, and even the United States
Congress, hope and believe. Yet they are coming, and there is every reason
to believe, regardless of how many different platform providers there are,
that consumers will have access to the widest variety of services.

